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ABSTRACT 
 
LEADERSHIP AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: COMPARATIVE CASE 
STUDIES OF ACEH AND KURDISH CONFLICTS 
 
Bağrıyanık, Muharrem 
MA, Department of Political Science and International Relations 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Talha Köse 
August 2016, 126 pages 
 
This thesis examines how the leaders of states and rebel groups influence conflict 
resolution. It argues that conciliatory gestures by the leaders could help to diminish 
tensions and mistrust between adversary groups. This study is based on the 
comparative case studies of the Aceh and Kurdish conflicts with regard to the impacts 
of the state and rebel group leaders. This study uses content analysis method to analyze 
the statements of the leaders. Then, it examines how these statements are reflected on 
their future decisions with regard to conflict resolution. In the Aceh conflict, especially 
after the Suharto regime, successor presidents were willing to end the conflict. In 2005, 
leaders of GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) and Indonesian government agreed and 
decades of conflict ended. On the other hand, Kurdish conflict still continues and there 
are ups and downs on the relations between the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê) 
and Turkish government. This study aims to analyze why the Kurdish conflict 
resolution process failed but the Aceh case reached peace. By taking lessons from the 
Aceh conflict it is aimed to provide alternative solutions to the Kurdish conflict from 
the leadership perspective. 
 
Keywords: Conflict Resolution, GAM, the PKK, Aceh, Kurdish, Leadership, 
Conciliation, Peace  
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ÖZ 
 
LİDERLİK VE ÇATIŞMA ÇÖZÜMÜ: KARŞILAŞTIRMALI ACEH VE KÜRT 
ÇATIŞMALARI ÇALIŞMASI 
 
Bağrıyanık, Muharrem. 
MA, Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Talha Köse 
Ağustos 2016, 126 sayfa 
 
Bu tez çalışması devlet ve develete isyan eden grupların liderlerinin çatışma çözümüne 
etkilerini araştırmaktadır. Çalışma, liderler tarafından yapılan uzlaştırıcı jestlerin 
aralarındaki tansiyonu ve güvensizlik durumunu azaltmaya yardım ettiğini iddia 
etmektedir.  Bu çalışma Aceh ve Kürt çatışmalarındaki devlet liderleri ile isyancı grup 
liderlerinin etkisini araştırmaya dayanmaktadır. İçerik analizi metodu kullanılarak 
liderlerin söylemlerinin birbirlerinin gelecekteki kararlarını nasıl etkilediği ele 
alınmıştır. Suharto rejiminden sonar gelen devlet başkanları Aceh çatışmasına son 
vermek istemişlerdir. 2005 yılında isyancı GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) örgütü ile 
Endonezya devleti anlaşarak onlarca yıl süren çatışmaya son vermişlerdir. Diğer 
taraftan Kürt çatışması devam etmektedir ve Türk hükümeti ile PKK (Partiya Karkerên 
Kurdistanê) arasında inişli ve çıkışlı bir süreç yaşamaktadır.  Bu çalışma Aceh çatışma 
barışla ile sona ereken, Kürt sorununun neden hala devam ettiğine bakmaktadır. Aceh 
çatışmasından ders alınarak Kürt çatışma çözümü için alternatif çözünler 
üretilmektedir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Çatışma Çözümü, GAM, PKK, Aceh, Kürt, Liderlik, Uzlaşma, 
Barış 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In our life everywhere we witness conflict and disputes, either at the international, 
regional, or national levels. They are inseparable an important part of the human life. 
Conflict emerges as a result of disagreements over goals, interests, and values between 
adversary parties (Deutsch & Coleman, 2000; Bar-Tal, 2011). The parties choose some 
strategies to cope with incompatible goals, emotions, actions, and images that escalate 
conflict such as contending, yielding, withdrawing, inaction, or problem-solving 
(Pruitt & Kim, 2004). Poor communication, hostile attitudes, mistrust, misjudgment, 
and misperception between group leaders could cause them to get stuck in vicious 
cycle of destructive conflict situation (Kriesberg, 1998). Bargaining, threats, and 
pressures are used by decision makers of the parties to influence other party’s 
decisions, attitudes, and behaviors (Pearson, 2001). Party leaders’ feelings, behaviors, 
and attitudes towards each other and their prediction of adversary party leader’s 
attitudes and behaviors defines dispute settlement of conflict between adversaries 
(Laad, 2005). Peace processes are based on reaching political agreement so that if 
conflicting parties are willing to reciprocate, explore other one’s bargaining range, and 
consider cost of continuing the conflict they can start to explore negotiation (Breslin 
& Rubin, 1993; Lederach, 1999; Pruitt & Kim, 2004).  
 
This thesis seeks to study the impacts of the group/party leaders on the peace process. 
The study of cases of the Aceh and Kurdish conflicts allow us to do a comparative 
examination of effect of decision-makers on conflict resolution. Thus, this course of 
study looks at the power of decision-makers to wring concessions from adversary 
leader, preventing new crisis and uncertainties, and creating viable structure of 
negotiation.  
 
1.1. Historical Background 
The conflict between government of Indonesia (GoI) and GAM (Gerakan Aceh 
Merdeka) was started in 1976 when GAM declared independence of the Aceh - a 
region which located in north western coast of the island Sumatra (Aspinall & Crouch, 
2003). Hasan di Tiro, founder of GAM, declared demands of the movement to the 
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Indonesian government, but government’s reply to those demands under President 
Suharto was counter-insurgency operation (Amer & Zou, 2011). Numerous GAM 
members were jailed or killed, whereas Hasan di Tiro was exiled. Early in the 1980s 
Hasan di Tiro ran “government-in exile” from Sweden and called GAM to prepare for 
renewed attacks on GoI. Second phase of the military operations was started in 1989 
after starting of GAM attacks and Indonesian government responded those attacks by 
turning Aceh into “military operation zone” (Aceh DOM) (Aspinall & Crouch, 2003). 
Military operation in Aceh region continued until Suharto resigned in 1998. Suharto 
was on the power for 31 years and he preferred to use military operations as an 
instruments to deal with Aceh conflict (Large & Aguswandi, 2008). Once Suharto left 
the office democratic reforms were introduced and Habibie became new President of 
the GoI (Amer & Zou, 2011).  Furthermore, military operations in Aceh were stopped 
and both President Habibie and military General in chief apologized for “mistakes in 
the past” (Large & Aguswandi, 2008). In 1999 with independence of East Timor from 
Indonesia with referendum triggered GAM leaders to call similar referendum for Aceh 
case too, but these demands were rejected as a result of military oppression on 
government (Meitzner, 2006). This decision caused another phase of violence in the 
region and the reason for rejecting referendum demand in Aceh was government’s fear 
of its trigger similar demands from other regions (AFP, 1999i; Amer & Zou, 2011).  
 
On the other hand, the Kurdish conflict was started officially with establishment of 
PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê-Kurdistan Worker’s Party) though there were 
formerly rebellions and demands. The developments that caused the emergence of the 
“Kurdish problem” in Turkey go back to initial years of the Republic and the single-
party rule era (Bozarslan, 2008). The Kurdish question was generally regarded as a 
security and order problem, and formerly it was thought that Kurds could be controlled 
through military measures and assimilation through denial, relocation, and forced 
migration (ibid.).  
 
When Turgut Ozal became President in 1989, there was change of the perception in 
terms of the Kurdish problem. In 1991 Turgut Ozal pledged to resolve the Kurdish 
problem and this statement was a first signal to give a name of the Kurdish problem. 
While Ozal was in the office, statements of the Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel and 
Deputy Prime Minister Erdal Inonu during their visit to Diyarbakır contributed to the 
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efforts started by Ozal (Bozarslan, 2008). In response to the initiatives and efforts, the 
PKK declared its first-ever unilateral ceasefire on March 20, 1993 (Bozarslan, 2008). 
In 1996 and 1997 the Prime Minister showed his willing to resolve the Kurdish 
problem while Mesut Yılmaz highlighted that government was compelled to address 
the Kurdish problem as a part of EU (European Union) bid by saying “the road to the 
EU goes through Diyarbakir (Bozarslan, 2008). 
 
Finally, PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan was captured in Kenya and transferred to the 
Turkey in 1999. After capture of Ocalan, the PKK declared unilateral cease-fire which 
continued until 2005 though there were armed conflict between PKK members and 
Turkish military forces (Bozarslan, 2008). After 2002 Erdoğan’s AK Party rose to the 
power and Erdoğan government started some essential reforms such as abolishing state 
of emergency, eliminating restrictions on the Kurdish language and Kurdish 
publications. 
 
1.2. Statement of the Problem  
General aim of this study is to provide better understanding for impact of the leadership 
on the resolution of the conflict. I studied the Kurdish and Aceh conflicts in terms of 
decisions, statements, attitudes, and behaviors of the state leaders from Indonesia and 
Turkey; on the other hand, PKK leaders, and Kurdish parliament members from 
Turkey and GAM leaders from Indonesia. For the Aceh conflict I focused on post-
Suharto period where after Suharto there was end of the long-standing of the 
dictatorship and democratic structure of political system implemented in Indonesia. 
As mentioned from previous sections with Habibie GoI tried to use alternative means 
to deal with conflict and some conciliatory gestures used to starts dialogue with GAM 
such as apologizing for mistakes in the past (Aspinall & Crouch, 2003). After that time 
state leaders opened place for negotiation with rebel GAM (Garekan Aceh Merdeka-
Free Aceh Movement) and from 1999 until the 2005 negotiation process and talks with 
GAM leaders had ups and downs. Since state leader created structure of opportunity 
for alternative means to the military operations through conciliatory gestures, this 
paper in the Aceh conflict analyzed impact of the state leaders and their relations with 
GAM leaders between 1999 and 2005, which resulted in peace.  
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On the other hand, although the Kurdish problem has long standing in Turkish history, 
this paper analyzed the Kurdish problem from 2005 until end of the 2009. The reason 
for choosing these dates are starting from 2005, for first time in Turkish history at 
government level the “Kurdish problem” was accepted and the policies of the Turkish 
state leadership changed in accordance with this changing perception on the Kurdish 
conflict mainly from security concern to multiple facets of the problem. So that study 
starts with Prime Minister Erdogan’s accept of the “Kurdish problem” and it continues 
until the end of the 2009 with “Habur incident”, which resulted in decrease of 
willingness of the Turkish state to continue with Kurdish conflict resolution.  
 
1.3. Significance of the Study 
Through this study, with results I gathered from a comparison of the cases we can 
understand the impact of the leaders and their decision on the future of the conflict. In 
the Aceh case after end of the Suharto regime state leaders started to negotiations and 
with succeeded Presidents peace process was failed until SBY (Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono) reached peace deal at the end of the 2005. On the other hand, in the 
Kurdish case although there were two times important initiatives from the government 
in 2005 and 2009, Kurdish case was failed. To take into account success of the Aceh 
peace process, it was aimed to show reasons for the failure of the Kurdish initiatives. 
Furthermore, with this thesis it was aimed to show mistakes that have done in the 
Kurdish cases and from these two examples other conflict resolution studies and 
negotiation adversaries can benefit what kind of steps should be followed for success 
of the resolution.  
 
1.4. Research Question 
Since this study is weighed on exploring impact of the decision-makers on conflict 
resolution with comparative study of the Kurdish and Aceh cases, the primary question 
of this study is: How do leaders or decision-makers of adversary parties contribute to 
conflict resolution? In order to deepen the argument this thesis also seek to answers 
following questions: How behavior and attitude of the adversary leaders could be 
changed to end conflict? What is the impact of the expectation of trust between 
adversary leaders for conflict resolution? What is the impact of the strong leadership 
for conflict resolution?  
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1.5. Research Design 
The methods I used throughout of this are both qualitative and quantitative methods. 
Quantitative method analyze data using statistical techniques to see if they can unveil 
patterns of human beings (OpenStax College, 2013).  In quantitative data research 
collected in numerical form so that by this counted form we can get detailed 
information about our research field. On the other hand qualitative method understands 
human behavior through depth interviews, focus groups, and analysis of content 
sources (OpenStax College, 2013). 
 
In my thesis I used content analysis of the popular media sources to get question for 
my research question. Since my aim is to show impact of the leaders on the conflict 
resolution I focused on to analyze statements of the adversary leaders on newspapers. 
For better data analysis I used Atlas.ti program to get statistical data for statements of 
the leaders. I uploaded all news related with my research area to the Atlas.ti and coded 
statements of the leaders whether these statements contributed to dialogue between 
adversaries or not. If statement of the leader contributed positively on peace process, 
I used code “conciliatory gestures” and if statement caused tension between leaders 
and escalated tension of the conflict I used “conflict escalator moves” code for those 
statements.  In data “frequency” used for how many times statements of the leader 
were related with codes shown on the figure. For example, on the figure in 2005 30 
frequencies for conciliatory gestures mean that there are that amount of statement of 
the leaders the positively affected conflict between adversary parties (Figure 1.1). The 
percentage area is used to show percentage of the code out of total codes. For example, 
in 2005 percentage of the conciliatory gestures was 60% of all codes. 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Data analysis of conflict 
 
For better understanding, I compared the Aceh and Kurdish cases with regard to impact 
of the leadership on conflict resolution. So, on both the Aceh and Kurdish conflict I 
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analyzed “conciliatory gestures”, which have positive impacts on the willingness of 
the adversary parties to reconcile and I used “conflict escalator moves” foe, which 
increase the intense of the conflict and impact negatively relations with one each other. 
Also in the Aceh conflict I used “Dialogue – Peace process” code differently from the 
Kurdish conflict. The reason for that is in some cases dialogue and peace process 
debates increase the hatred and mistrust between adversaries since the conflict of the 
interests, but in some cases it affects positively relations between parties. I coded: 
 Acehnese education,  
 visit of president to Aceh,  
 cessation of hostility agreements,  
 disarmament,  
 renounce from independence by GAM,  
 halt of military operations,  
 help to Aceh, mediator debates,  
 meeting with NGOs and Acehnese,  
 visit of monitor team to Aceh,  
 release of GAM members from jail,  
 accept of mistakes in the past,  
 decrease numbers of troops in Aceh,  
 and withdraw of troops from Aceh 
as “conciliatory gestures” in the Aceh conflict. These all codes positively affected 
relations between GAM and GoI (Government of Indonesia). For the Kurdish case: 
 Autonomy  
 Basque model 
 Bulgarian model 
 Call opposition to cooperate 
 Kurdish deputies call PKK to cooperate  
 Change stance of PKK and state towards each other 
 Starting communication 
 Condemn PKK 
 Consultation 
 Democratic Initiative 
 Deny violence 
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 Dialogue process 
 Disarmament 
 Diyarbakir trip 
 Empathy to Turkish soldier 
 Halt of military operations 
 Point out “Hope” 
 Meeting with intellectuals 
 Kurdish identity 
 Kurdish language allowance 
 “Kurdish minority” 
 “Kurdish problem” 
 “Kurdish initiative” 
 Law changes 
 Letter to opposition 
 Mediator 
 Meeting with ministers, NGOs, opposition, pro-Kurdish party with regard to 
Kurdish conflict 
 MGK support 
 Negotiation 
 New agenda 
 “White page”   
 Ocalan 
 Participatory resolution 
 Peace process 
 Public support 
 Reforms 
 Accept responsibility 
 Mistakes in the past 
 “Road map” 
 Self-blame of DTP 
 Slam opposition for not support  
 Strong local administration 
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are important codes that are used for “conciliatory gestures.” Beside, with regard to 
the Aceh conflict codes for “conflict escalator moves” are: 
 arrest of Acehnese 
 martial law 
 military operations 
 military pressure 
 state of emergency 
 martial law 
 violence 
 blame 
 restrict journalists to the Aceh region 
 GAM attacks 
 Kidnap 
 Reject cease-fire 
 Independence insistence 
 
On the other hand, for Kurdish conflict codes of “conflict escalator are”: 
 Arrest-investigation of Kurds 
 Boycott education by Kurds 
 Conflicting attitudes from state and PKK 
 DTP closure 
 Ethnic nationalism 
 Habur incident 
 Kidnap 
 “Kurdish state” 
 Military operations 
 Refuse to meet with pro-Kurdish party members 
 Resign of pro-Kurdish deputies 
 Promises not given 
 Protests 
 “revenge” 
 Şemdinli incident 
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 PKK attacks 
 Threat by PKK 
 “tutelage regime” 
 “Warning” state 
 
These codes are used for quantitative analysis of the Kurdish and Aceh conflicts. 
Through using codes, we got some data and from data I analyzed the statements of the 
leaders and approaches of the states towards each other and how their behavior and 
attitudes affected from adversary’s statements and through these statements we see 
that adversary leader reschedule one’s attitude and behavior by inferring expected trust 
from these statements. Due to lack of time, I mainly focused on “Hurriyet Daily News” 
mainstream newspaper from Turkey, which printed in English. For the Aceh conflict 
because of disadvantage of not speaking the Indonesian language I used international 
news agencies’ news about the Aceh conflict. For the Aceh case, it was hard to find 
news between 1998 and 2005. On the internet I could reach news about Aceh only in 
the Indonesian language but I could not use them. English news related to the Aceh 
conflict wanted subscription and English based newspapers demanded huge amount 
of money to reach their archives between 1998 and 2005. But thanks Lexis-Nexis Data 
Resource through using my university account I was able to reach archives of the news 
agencies for free. Because my thesis is about to analyze impacts of the adversary 
leaders on the conflict resolution, for their statements I used daily printed newspapers. 
In conclusion, I compared the Aceh and Kurdish conflicts with regard to leadership 
impact, how leaders are affected from the structure, how they defined structure of the 
conflict, and how they contributed to the resolution of the conflict. Since the Aceh 
conflict ended with peaceful resolution but it is not the case for the Kurdish conflict, I 
elaborate the reason of the failure of the conflict resolution from the perspective of 
impacts of leadership on conflict resolution.  
 
1.6. Theoretical Framework 
There can be some stops and pauses and ups and down as a result of negotiation 
process and factors contributed. Conciliation between parties based on accurate 
communication and their willingness to use that way. The exchange of the signals by 
the leaders also contribute the peace process. The assurance of stance of the leaders 
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also helps the transformation of the protracted conflicts into peaceful path. The time 
conciliatory initiative started is also important. Both sides could understand that the 
military means cannot help them to reach their aims. Besides the other party leaders’ 
characteristics is also important. Strong leadership at other sides and who is not 
manipulated by the domestic developments and could stand against harsh criticism 
from opponents are also important determinants for conciliation and start of the 
negotiation.  
 
The context of the conflict as a factor define decisions of the actors. The context for a 
conciliatory gesture is defining factor for success of the peace process. For example, 
to initiate conciliatory gestures by the state to adversary at the height of the military 
operations against organization is less likely to be successful than to initiate same 
conciliatory moves when there is temporary cease-fire between adversaries (Mitchell, 
2000).  The context of the peace process is constructed by the leaders of adversary 
groups or some natural events. For example, in the Kurdish case the Diyarbakir trip 
and European Union (EU) membership and its popularity with AK Party government 
changed the context and created chance for peace process. Also the tsunami disaster 
in Aceh caused a high death toll. This disaster prevented protracted conflict and 
empathy towards victims of the disaster who are generally from Aceh mitigate parties 
towards each other and conciliated steps followed afterwards (Meitzner, 2006).  
 
Decision making process during protracted conflict based on the win the conflict.  If 
parties notice that win is not anymore on their agenda since both sides are insisting on 
winning, adversaries develop their policies to counter policies of the adversary or 
creates policies and goals to make them to quit (Mitchell, 2000).  Decision-makers by 
changing of the context of the protracted of the conflict, they re-evaluate their options, 
ends, means, costs, benefits, and probabilities (Mitchell, 2000).  
 
Changes produces probabilities and uncertainty for the decision-makers, so that they 
changes also actions and goals inevitably (Mitchell, 2000). Changes do not affect the 
prevention of the intractable conflict if influential leaders are still prone to continue on 
the use of violence towards each other. For example, after the tsunami disaster while 
the structural change occurs, it was decision of the leaders who step forward with 
regard to conciliated gestures.  In the Kurdish case, there was not any sign of the 
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mitigation between the state and the PKK organization. But after leader’s change of 
the rhetoric and acceptance of the existence of the “problem,” the structure changed 
and the willingness and optimism for peace process increased. The change that has 
effect on decision-maker can be said for both parties they noticed that without common 
ground and dialogue they could not end the conflict.  
 
Signals for conciliatory gestures helps to melting ices between leaders. For example, 
to accept that there is Kurdish Problem and the assurance of the state for solution is 
good example. Symbols used by adversary party is a signal to show that they are 
willing to talk (Mitchell, 2000). Governments show signals and some symbolic 
attitudes that they are willing to solve problem. Signals of ending military operation, 
push adversary group’s leaders to consider initiatives for dialogues, to announce the 
start of the peace process, etc. some types of signals for interaction between the parties 
(Mitchell, 2000). 
 
According to Mitchell, there are four types of conciliatory gestures helping peace 
process: 
1 concessions 
2 symbolic gestures 
3 tension reducing measures (TRMs) 
4 confidence building measures (CBMs), 
 
1.6.1. Concessions and Concession Making 
Concession makes parties to come together since one party accept to give up on 
insisting the one it wants and through this concession parties’ confrontation topics 
decrease and cancel of dialogue increases. Here it is important to contemplate that 
whether it is better to make concession at first level of the negotiations or insisting on 
demand by party until adversary hold out of his bargaining position. This problem is I 
thing related with the optimism and trust situation in the negotiation. If they are 
optimistic and trust the willingness of the adversary, the regard the ending protracted 
conflict, the probability of the dialogue increases and another party could be ease to 
concede from its demands. At pre-negotiation level it rare that parties make 
concessions. Besides, it more visible at the beginning of the peace process (Mitchell, 
2000). Also if there is clear position of the other party in terms of their demands, 
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resistance points and giving up terms becomes more clear (Mitchell, 2000). For 
another the “reference point” where parties start to talk and the aim of the parties to 
get and what concession they are ready to give at most in their mind is also important 
factor for defining peace process. If there is more probability of the overlapping of the 
concession the party ready to give up and the concession other party wants, then it is 
highly that peace process can end successfully or there can be more fruitful negotiation 
between parties.  
 
1.6.2. Symbolic Gestures 
Leaders use signals for the purpose of: to indicate their willingness to de-escalate the 
conflict, to send peace feelers to end hostilities, or to overcome halt of peace process. 
Some unexpected gestures which can be basic in its nature but the structure it was 
shown put different meaning to the signal.   
 
1.6.3. Tensions Reducing Measures 
Mitchell defines tension reducing measure as: 
Concrete moves or statements made to avoid or reduce the dangers arising from 
situations of crisis or confrontation (usually involving coercive force) which have a 
high probability of escalating towards new levels of violence…In many cases, TRMs 
are usually employed prior to concessions in that they are assumed to be necesary to 
remove generally debilitating feelings and attitudes from a target and to enable that 
party's leaders to recognize other forms of conciliatory gestures, which may later 
include some clear concessions. (Mitchell, 2000). 
Tension reducing attempts for preventing confrontation between parties can be seen in 
the Aceh and Kurdish conflicts. In the Aceh conflict for example at 2005 Newroz 
celebrations some chıldren burned the Turkısh flag which caused incredible reaction 
all around the Turkey. All around the Turkey people waved Turkish flag at their 
apartment and even demonstrated in important city centers.  
 
1.6.4. Confidence Building Measure 
By confidence building measures, it means unilateral action to diminish, abandon, or 
removing some means of destructive damage on a target, or demonstrating its 
unwillingness to use such means. 
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The state leader and organization leaders on build confidence among each other to 
diminish mistrust and to create trust that it will less likely to use unpleasant action by 
its side towards other party side such as military operations by the state and attack by 
other party member fighters (Mitchell, 2000).  
 
1.7. Assumptions and Limitations 
Based on preliminary literature review that has been taken as part of writing of this 
thesis, the assumption this thesis is that for conflict resolution in the Kurdish conflict 
Turkish leaders should start dialogue channels with the PKK. Moreover, since there is 
asymmetric power relation in ethno-nationalist the Aceh and Kurdish conflicts, 
rebellion group leaders tend to behave resistant on demands of the state. For that 
reason, on intra-state, state- rebellion group conflicts attitudes and behaviors of the 
state leaders and their policies are determinant factor for conflict resolution.  
 
Another assumption is that because of the asymmetric power relations with state, the 
PKK and GAM are insistence on their demands and showing less propensity to 
renounce from their demand. They used this attitude and behavior as instrumental 
power against state. To decrease probability of use of asymmetric power relation with 
state as an instrument against state and to increase chance of peace process the power 
of the rebel group should be decreased so that it can call for dialogue. For example, 
since the tsunami disaster decreased its power, GAM accepted peace talks with GoI. 
Another assumption is that strong state leadership and weak critic of military is another 
determinant factor for the future of the conflict. In 2005 the Kurdish conflict due to 
strong critic of the military the initiatives to end conflict failed. Furthermore, in the 
Aceh conflict with weakened resistance of military helped to success of peace process 
with strong leadership of the SBY.  
 
There are also several limitations in this study. First, since there was lack of time I 
could not have time to enlarge content resources for more statements of the leaders. 
Secondly, since I could not speak Indonesian language, I had to use international news 
agency resources for content analysis such as Deustche-Presse Agentur, AP, AFP, etc.  
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1.8. Thesis Outline 
In the Chapter 2, theoretical analysis of leadership, types of leadership in conflict 
resolution will be explained. This chapter explains how leaders promote relations 
between each other by using tension reducing, confidence building measures, and 
symbolic gestures. Between leaders for conciliation the impact of the gestures and will 
be explained with some examples.  
 
In the Chapter 3 and 4, the Aceh and Kurdish conflicts will be explained from 1998 
until 2005 peace for Aceh and from 2005 until 2010 for the Kurdish cases. On these 
chapter this impact of the leaders, what kind of conciliatory gestures contributed and 
what kind of conflict escalator moves prevented peace talks in the Aceh and Kurdish 
conflicts will be analyzed. In my analysis I used empirical data sources and 
interpretation of the data for impact of the gestures and conflict escalator moves on 
their attitude and behavior towards each other.  
 
In the Conclusion chapter, there will be comparison of the data obtained from the 
successful Aceh and the failed Kurdish cases. It will summarize key points and main 
finding of former two chapters and highlights similarity and differences of these two 
cases. Furthermore, from the findings of these cases it is aimed to show what steps 
should be followed for success of the Kurdish conflict and how leaders should 
approach towards each other for conflict resolution.   
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CHAPTER 2 
LEADERS’ CONCILIATION AND BUILDING THE PEACE 
 
In our global community nation states legitimizing their use of force for reasons of the 
security and defense of the state (Lederach, 1999). The process of the identity conflicts 
of the clan, ethnicity, religion, or other types of identification of the groups based on 
long-standing fear, hatred, distrust of the leader of the groups towards each other that 
is reinforced by use of violence and atrocity (Gawerc, 2006; Benton & Druckman, 
1974). Identity conflicts emerges when a group or community could not see responses 
with regard to economic, social, and cultural security and to struggle for political 
recognition (Lederach, 1999). These conflicts change its structure with time and in 
some cases impact of the leader increases since they started to redefine the relations of 
the community with the state authorities.  
 
Changes in the conflict structure are important that helps us to construe developments 
of the conflict. These “changes” are the nature of the change, the intensity of the 
change, and the rapidity of the change (Mitchell, The Nature of Intractable Conflict: 
Resolution in the Twenty-first Century, 2014). Change is important for the 
transformation of the conflict. Sometimes one “change” can accelerate talks and 
negotiations, but in some cases it is more “changes” needed for the peace process 
initiations. Structural change happens by leaders of the groups and their steps to 
conciliate with other group leaders. Conciliatory gestures by state leaders affect 
structure of the conflict and create “change” to new phase of peace. The intentions, 
trust, optimism, hope about future of conflict resolution defines attitudes of the 
adversary leaders. The more propensity of the leaders to talk each other the more 
chance adversary group’s reach to conflict resolution (Bar-Tal, 2013).  
 
2.1. De-Escalation of the Conflict, Leaders, and Conciliation  
2.1.1. De-Escalation of the Conflict 
De-escalation starts when party/parties realize that it cannot get acceptable cost and 
risk through violent means. Besides, leaders also unwilling to give a way to the other 
party’s victory through yielding and withdrawal (Pruitt & Kim, 2004). This behavior 
could cause loss of pride of the parties at the eyes of their group members. For problem 
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solving parties should come to a point that it cannot get what it want without consent 
of the other party’s consent (Pruitt D. G., 2002). This problem solving strategy 
responds with the cooperative strategy of Mitchell (Mitchell, 1981). Both assumption 
of problem solving and cooperative strategy based on changing stance of adversaries 
towards each other (Klimesova, 2016). This consent come to a point when only party 
declared proposal that is acceptable for the other party. The perceived stalemate creates 
opportunity for acceptable proposals between the parties (Pruitt & Kim, Social 
Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, 2004).  When party takes first step to 
get out of stalemate, the door opens for de-escalation and negotiation phase starts, 
which is a process of “a discussion among two or more parties with the apparent aim 
of resolving a divergence of interest” (Pruitt & Carnevale, Negotiation in Social 
Conflict, 1993). The negotiation at its initiation is based on overt conflict, conflict of 
the interest between parties and from this conflict later on it transforms into possibility 
of common ground for peace process (Pruitt & Kim, Social Conflict: Escalation, 
Stalemate, and Settlement, 2004). Sometimes this process failed and negotiation could 
not revolve into resolution process and break up negotiations which could lead to re-
use of violent means (Zubek, Pruitt, McGillicuddy, Peirce, & Syna, 1992).  In Kurdish 
and Aceh cases there were trials of negotiations with the aim of ending conflict but it 
fails to turn into collaborative action and restart of the violence. For example in 2003 
GAM and Jakarta government leader negotiated at Tokyo (Japan Economic Newswire, 
Aceh peace talks held for 2nd day as deadline nears, 2003). But after some talks and 
meetings between those parties failed to turn into continuation to end conflict, after 
failure of talks and meetings military operations restarted at the Acehnese territory 
(Agence France Presse, 2003). Similarly, in 2009, there were talk of government 
leader, Erdogan, with PKK leaders and leader Ocalan through channels of Intellectuals 
and pro-Kurdish party deputies. But after some incidents the negotiations failed to 
bring peace process and caused military operations to PKK camps and attacks by PKK 
fighters to security forces (Hürriyet Daily News, 2009a).  
 
To continue a negotiation in a positive way, parties need to be optimist and could see 
that there are opportunities for the success (Pruitt, 1997). Parallel to that there should 
be trust among negotiators for working together or continue to work together 
(Klimesova, 2016). If there could not be trust for dialogue between parties, then it 
would be higher probability that parties could continue to fight. So for party to 
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continue negotiation it is important that there should be belief that there are willing 
parties and negotiations could reach mutually acceptable conditions (Pruitt & Kim, 
Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, 2004). The important factor for 
parties to make them prone to the belief of the way for mutual acceptable conditions 
is negotiators are representative of the society who have influence in terms of political 
determinants of the community (Pruitt & Kim, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, 
and Settlement, 2004). For example, in both the Kurdish and Aceh cases, the state 
showed its propensity to start negotiation process with GAM leaders in Aceh and with 
PKK leaders in the Kurdish case since there was belief that these leaders have the 
influence on the implementation of the policies or decisions taken through the 
negotiations and they are important determinants of the communities’ actions. Also in 
terms of the state institution we can see that leaders of GAM and the PKK know that 
through accepting state leaders for negotiation, there could be peace since state is the 
authority on the future of the territory it controls (Zartman, 1995). Besides, parties 
from both sides, on the one hand state and on the other hand GAM and PKK leaders 
noticed that they could not reach their ends through use of military operations by the 
state and attacks by organization. This level is called as mutually hurting stalemate or 
ripe moment (Mitchell, 2014; Zartman, 2007). This situation pushed the leaders to be 
more prone to be committed to start dialogue and optimistic on the future of the 
negotiations (Klimesova, 2016). So the circumstances also ease or cloud the 
approaches of the parties towards each other. But it is important to mention that it is 
party leaders who is deciding whether to start negotiation or continue to fight. Their 
willingness defines the phase of the conflict or negotiation and its result. For example 
on the Aceh case in 2003 the unwillingness of the state and GAM leaders prevented 
the continuation of the negotiation and positive atmosphere suddenly turned into 
restarting of the war (Agence France Presse, 2003). On the other hand, in 2009 the 
well-developed initiatives started by state leader in Turkey stopped after the AK Party 
(Justice and Development Party) government showed unwillingness on insistence for 
continuation of the peace process after Habur incident (Hürriyet Daily News, 2009b). 
As we can see from samples of the Kurdish and Aceh conflicts, leadership institution 
has an impact on the process off the development of the dialogue between adversary 
groups. From this point of view, it is better to clarify types of the leaderships and 
especially the one of them which is the top-level leadership and its impact on 
developments of the talks and negotiation between adversary groups.  
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2.2. Leadership Types 
2.2.1. Top-Level Leadership 
When we look at the all affected population in the internal conflicts, each group is 
represented by their leaders and other actors, as well as the roles they play in terms of 
problem dealing. In some groups, top level leadership is visible, by that I mean, some 
organizations more constructed by the strong influence of the leaders. In some 
communities, key political and military leaders are the decision making figures for 
continuation of the conflicts. Their attitudes define the intractability of the conflict and 
their approaches towards adversary group leaders transforms decisively the structure 
of the conflict. In the opposition group in the intrastate conflicts top leader of the group 
is generally takes his strong power from his charismatic leadership. If leader of the 
group has charismatic influence his/her impact to transform society to culture of peace 
becomes easier since through one’s charisma society member follows and admire 
him/her (OpenStax College, 2013). These leaders are visible and great attention is paid 
to their statements and positions to adversary part leaders. Their statements takes lot 
of press coverage and air time (Bar-Tal, 2013; Lederach, 1999). It is their statements 
and positions characterize future of the conflict (Lederach, 1999). Changes of their 
positions with regard to conflict and attitudes of leaders towards each other personally 
affects future of the conflict.  On the peace process it is generally focused on the high-
level negotiations between these top leaders, and it is more based on the cease-fire 
when negotiations starts and talks and meetings generally led by visible mediator 
(Ibid.). These top leaders are could be from military, political, religious domains with 
high visibility.  
 
Beside of the top-level leadership, there are also other types of the top down peace 
process by the leadership namely middle range and grass-root leadership. They 
maintain their leadership on the society by more visibility of their names and profile 
image they succeeded to construct among the people. Since they have high profile 
among public this structure sometimes creates deadlock for perspectives on the issues 
in the conflict (Ibid.). Leaders could abstain to deal with other group leader for solution 
which may diminish their influence on their group. For government leader anything 
less accepted by the opposition group leader could diminish their publicity and 
popularity among society and can be interpreted as weakness (Pruitt & Carnevale, 
1993; Pruitt & Kim, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, 2004). On 
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other side, for opposition leaders more steps to the solution can diminish their 
influence on the group member since there is no more “other” group to hate and threat 
possibility from other group after assured peace. On this situations decision of the 
adversary leader is important to see whether they want peace or continuation of their 
leadership on the group members at the expense of continuation of violence. 
 
In some hierarchical leader organizations, there can be diffuse of power among group 
members so that there can be hierarchical leaders in an organization. Different leader 
at different level may have power that can resist decisions of the visible leader of the 
organization (Lederach, 1999). 
 
2.2.2. Middle Range Leadership 
In the middle range leadership, their leadership is not coming from the authority they 
have on the organization or on the structure of formal government. Instead, these 
middle-range leaders are highly respected people in the society and/or they may 
occupy formal positions of the leadership at the institutions of such as education, 
health, business, agriculture, etc.  They may also are prominent figure of the religious 
group, academic institution, or humanitarian organization (Lederach, 1999). Yet 
another possibility is that they can be famous poet or Nobel laureate, making them 
popular among society (Lederach, 1999). So these middle range leaders are known by 
the top-level leaders and they generally have important connections. Their influence 
of the middle-range leadership is not based on the occupying political or military 
power. This power comes generally from the relationship they have through their 
professional connections, institutional, formal, or other matters of networks they have 
(Lederach, 1999). They do not need visibility and publicity for their leadership and 
they are freer then top level leaders, they can travel with inconspicuousness that is 
difficult for top level leaders. In a society numbers of the middle range leaders are 
more than top level leaders.  
 
Leaders at middle range level have a determinant location and they can create 
infrastructure for sustaining peace. According to Lederach (1999), the middle range 
leadership for peacebuilding has not developed yet, but there are parallel categories 
for peace: problem-solving workshops, conflict resolution training, and development 
of peace commissions. The problem solving workshops which generally refers for 
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“interactive problem solving” or “third party consultation” creates opportunity for 
persons who are unofficially representing the party to the table for talks. Christopher 
Mitchell summarize that this approach involves:  
informal, week-long meetings of the representatives of parties in protracted, deep 
rooted, and frequently violent conflict in an informal, often academic, setting that 
permits the re-analysis of their conflict as a shared problem and the generation of some 
alternative courses of action to continued coercion, together with new options for a 
generally acceptable and self-sustaining resolution (Mitchell, The Nature of 
Intractable Conflict: Resolution in the Twenty-first Century, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Types of Actors 
 
At this level, the participants are invited since they have knowledge about the conflict 
and have proximity to key decision makers of the communities. Mitchell (2014) 
defines these groups as opinion leaders who are influential figure on the opinion of the 
people. 
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2.2.3. Grassroots Leadership 
The grassroots leadership associated with base of the society. At this level of the 
leadership, leaders include local community, member of the nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), carrying relief projects for local communities, health officials, 
and refugee camp leaders (Lederach, 1999). These people are more expert on the 
demands and fear of the local communities. They are more close to the local 
community, expert on local politics, and generally they can easily earn trust of the 
local community compare to other level of the leaderships. At the identity conflict 
grassroots leaders witness at first hand to the impact of the conflict on the society and 
spread of hatred and animosity of group members towards other group members.  
 
2.3. Leaders and De-escalation of the Conflict 
As aforementioned via some samples the leaders of the adversary groups have impact 
on peace process. The willingness of the top level leaders for starting talks and 
assurance to solve conflict through peaceful means accelerate the peace process and 
ease the burden of third party mediator’s burden. Once the negotiations started it 
should be guaranteed the free space for protagonists to unveil their aims and demands 
at the meeting table (Lederach, 1999; Benton & Druckman, 1974). To continue 
successfully negotiations at the table, cease-fire between two sides is often focused, 
which bring talks to the other levels of the political and other negotiation articles 
(Lederach, 1999).  
 
Achieving peace is lying how to identify the representative leaders of the sides (Pruitt 
& Kim, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, 2004). These leaders 
come to table with claim of representing and/or are accepted as the representative of 
the group. The negotiation between parties starts when they accept other leaders as 
representative of the group they claim. Besides, top leaders have the power, or at least 
the influence, to deliver the support of the community for the implementation of the 
agreement reached at table (Lederach, 1999; Benton & Druckman, 1974). In the peace 
processes of the Aceh and Kurdish cases we can see the patterns of leadership and the 
time frames for peace. In the Aceh case political leaders stopped the military 
operations towards Gerekan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement, GAM) rebellion 
group of Acehnese ethnic group. In the Kurdish case also there was decrease of the 
military operations and attacks of rebellion group of Kurdish organization the Partiyan 
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Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK) towards security forces. At the first level of the top-level 
negotiations it is aimed to reach cease-fire, and then step by step there is more issue 
oriented talks engaged by top-level leaders (Lederach, 1999).  
 
To guarantee that violence will not start again in the future between adversaries is more 
difficult task than stopping the violence (Mitchell, The Nature of Intractable Conflict: 
Resolution in the Twenty-first Century, 2014). In the Kurdish and Aceh cases there 
were some examples of the temporary ceasefires but later this situation turned into 
violence again.  At this level on the one hand, it is aimed to deepen the analysis of the 
problem and innovating solutions to the conflict, on the other hand, through 
participation process it is aimed to broaden the participants and their perceptions on 
the issue (Lederach, 1999).  Through this level of peacebuilding process adversaries 
who are not willing to negotiate directly can communicate indirectly and can 
encourage both sides to develop relationships between each other. A third party 
negotiator at this level helps participants to come together and provide knowledge for 
the analysis of the conflict, show that there are alternatives such as interaction to the 
coercion or violence towards each other (Lederach, 1999). 
 
Sometimes there is a situation in which one side need to see other party’s leaders’ 
intention so in accordance with that they will be courageous to act and behalf of contact 
and communication. At this point unilateral actions by the party to show other party 
its willingness creates communication space for parties (Pruitt & Kim, Social Conflict: 
Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, 2004). If other party was also ready to act 
toward resolution its reply will be in positive way. At this kind of relation, the most 
important aim of the action is to destroy negative images of itself on other party and 
to trigger structural changes on their relations. Besides, the initiative for started by the 
advantageous sides creates more optimistic space than if it is started by weaker one. 
For example, in the Aceh and Kurdish cases state took unilateral steps to show their 
willingness to start dialogue. In the Aceh case, state leader after the tsunami disaster 
declared that it is better to start negotiations to end conflict. At that time since the 
tsunami hit Aceh province at most and caused huge damages and death tolls, GAM 
became weak. State authorities, instead of see this as an advantage to attack GAM, 
leadership showed unilateral action with the aim of ending conflict. It was replied 
positively by GAM leaders and accelerated the meeting and negotiations. On the hand, 
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in the Kurdish case, in 2005 prime minister Erdogan’s Diyarbakır trip and there his 
acceptance of the existence of the Kurdish issue first time by state leader in Turkey 
changed the structure of conflict and this unilateral action accelerated initiatives for 
resolution of the Kurdish conflict (Hurriyet Daily News, 2005o).   
 
If one party leader aims to independence and continue on this demand it makes 
communication difficult and decrease the mitigation between protagonists. Instead, if 
there is acceptance of interdependence and less emphasis on independency, there hope 
for future in terms of continuation of the communication (Mitchell, 2014).  
 
The changes of attitude of Erdogan towards the Kurdish problem has extensive 
impacts. By this behavior state leader intended to affect PKK leaders that the state is 
willing to conciliate and open to dialogue. Secondly, state leader also wants to show 
its public opinion that this conflict cannot be solved only through military operations. 
Besides, it need talks and meetings with representatives of the community rebelled 
against state authority. Moreover, the state by this attitude claim to influence public 
opinion of the ethnic group. The state aims to earn trust of the ethnic community and 
shows the state is willing to resolve the conflict. A state leader at this point also has 
impacts on the perception of the ethnic community. For example, after Erdogan’s 
Diyarbakir trip Kurdish society’s hope for resolution increased since the state leader 
changed rhetoric of the state about the Kurdish problem. Since the attitude of the harsh 
policies on the Kurdish issues deceased this also transformed the attitudes of the 
Turkish people to Kurdish citizens.  
 
Alternative evaluations of the origin intention of the leaders’ attitudes also defines 
structure of the conflict. If opponent party leader contemplates it as a threat to their 
security and interpret this initiatives by state leaders as an instrument to decrease 
tension for the interest of the preparation of the state security forces, we cannot say 
that collaborative actions by readers fail to bring peace process on the ground. Here 
the trust between leaders and optimism about the future defines the attitudes of the 
leaders towards each other. Positive comments or moreover abstaining to comment on 
the attitude of the state leaders at negotiation process or starting dialogue helps 
continuation of the negotiation. Because if there will be negative comments or 
comments that implies mistrust to state authorities could destroy the conciliation by 
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the state towards its adversaries. It is similar with a state leader’s stance to adversary 
also. If they continue to call organization leaders who have influence on the 
community as “terrorist”, this kinds of rhetoric instead of contribute the negotiation 
between parties could destroy the meeting and could push parties to use military action 
towards each other.  
 
The gestures of a state leader and response of the adversary is important for us to 
understand the process of the negotiation and implications for the success. It is 
important to see how leaders respond to the gestures by adversaries towards each other 
(Mitchell, 2000).  
 
Sometimes the sudden abandonment of the earlier process in terms of the conflict. 
Erdogan accepted the Kurdish conflict as a “problem” instead of rejecting existence of 
it and acceptance of the mistakes done in the past changed the atmosphere of the 
process. On the other hand, the Aceh case, GoI leaders Megawati and the SBY (Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono) visits to Aceh province and their also comments that there were 
mistakes done in the past and instead of using only military means their willingness to 
start talk with GAM leaders also changes the structure of the conflict and eased the 
atmosphere for initiating negotiations between party leaders.  
 
2.4. Conciliation  
There is no guarantee the peace process will continue smoothly. There can be some 
starts and stops and ups and down as a result of negotiation process and factors 
contributed. Conciliation between parties based on accurate communication and their 
willingness to use that way. The exchange of the signals by leaders also contribute the 
peace process. The assurance of stance of the leaders also helps the transformation of 
the protracted conflicts into peaceful path. The time conciliatory initiative started is 
also important. Both sides could understand that the military means cannot help them 
to reach their aims. Besides the other party leaders’ characteristics is also important. 
Strong leadership at other sides and who is not manipulated by the domestic 
developments and could stand against harsh criticism from opponents are also 
important determinants for conciliation and start of the negotiation.  
The context of the conflict as a factor define decisions of the actors. The context for a 
conciliatory gesture is defining factor for success of the peace process. For example, 
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to initiate conciliatory gestures by the state to adversary at the height of the military 
operations against organization is less likely to be successful than to initiate same 
conciliatory moves when there is temporary cease-fire between adversaries (Mitchell, 
2000). The context of the peace process is constructed by the leaders of adversary 
groups or some natural events. For example, in the Kurdish case the Diyarbakir trip 
and European Union (EU) membership and its popularity with the AK Party 
government changed the context and created chance for peace process. Also the 
tsunami disaster in Aceh caused a great death toll. This disaster prevented protracted 
conflict and empathy towards victims of the disaster who are generally from Aceh 
mitigate parties towards each other and conciliated steps followed afterwards 
(Meitzner, 2006).  
 
Decision making process during protracted conflict based on winning the conflict.  If 
parties notice that winning is not anymore on their agenda since both sides are insisting 
on winning, adversaries develop their policies to counter policies of the adversary or 
creates policies and goals to make them to quit (Mitchell, 2000). Decision-makers by 
changing of the context of the protracted of the conflict, they re-evaluate their options, 
ends, means, costs, benefits, and probabilities (Mitchell, 2000).  
 
Changes produces probabilities and uncertainty for the decision-makers, so that it 
changes also actions and goals inevitably (Mitchell, 2000). Changes does not affect 
the prevention of the intractable conflict if influential leaders are still prone to continue 
on the use of violence towards each other. For example, after the tsunami disaster while 
the structural change occurs, it was decision of the leaders who step forward with 
regard to conciliated gestures.  In the Kurdish case, there was not any sign of the 
mitigation between the state and the PKK organization. But after leader’s change of 
the rhetoric and acceptance of the existence of the “problem,” the structure changed 
and the willingness and optimism for peace process increased. The change that has 
effect on decision-maker can be said for both parties they noticed that without common 
ground and dialogue they could not end the conflict.  
 
Signals for conciliatory gestures helps to melting ices between leaders. For example, 
to accept that there is a Kurdish Problem and the assurance of the state for solution is 
good example. Symbols used by adversary party is a signal to show that they are 
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willing to talk (Mitchell, 2000). Governments show signals and some symbolic 
attitudes that they are willing to solve problem. Signals of ending military operation, 
push adversary group’s leaders to consider initiatives for dialogues, to announce the 
start of the peace process, etc., some types of signals for interaction between the parties 
(Mitchell, 2000). 
 
According to Mitchell, there are four types of conciliatory gestures helping peace 
process: 
1 concessions 
2 symbolic gestures 
3 tension reducing measures (TRMs) 
4 confidence building measures (CBMs), 
 
2.4.1. Concessions and Concession Making 
Concession makes parties to come together since one party accepts to give up on 
insisting the one it wants and through this concession parties’ confrontation topics 
decrease and cancel of dialogue increases. Here it is important to contemplate whether 
it is better to make concession at first level of the negotiations or insisting on demand 
by party until adversary hold out of his bargaining position. This problem is I think 
related with the optimism and trust situation in the negotiation. If they are optimistic 
and trust the willingness of the adversary, the regard the ending protracted conflict, the 
probability of the dialogue increases and another party could be ease to concede from 
its demands. At pre-negotiation level it rare that parties make concession. Besides, it 
more visible at the beginning of the peace process (Mitchell, 2000). Also if there is 
clear position of the other party in terms of their demands, resistance points, and giving 
up terms becomes more clear (Mitchell, 2000). For another the “reference point” where 
parties start to talk and the aim of the parties to get and what concession they are ready 
to give at most in their mind is also important factor for defining peace process. If there 
is more probability of the overlapping of the concession the party ready to give up and 
the concession other party wants, then it is highly that peace process can end 
successfully or there can be more fruitful negotiation between parties.  
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2.4.2. Symbolic Gestures 
There are such moves that represent conciliation form that do not cost too much for 
the party to move out from previous bargaining position. For examples, President 
Nixon’s use of Chinese People’s Republic, and resign of the Commissar for Foreign 
Affairs of USSR in the Stalin era are signal to other party leaders for conciliation 
without costing too much cost from their previous position (Mitchell, 2000). Leaders 
use signals for the purposes of: to indicate their willingness to de-escalate the conflict, 
to send peace feelers to end hostilities, or to overcome halt of peace process. Some 
unexpected gestures which can be basic in its nature but the structure it was shown put 
different meaning to the signal. For example, after the Aceh peace pact was signed, 
the handshake of the GoI leader and GAM leaders in front of press made this gesture 
as important signal for long-standing the Aceh conflict (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 
ROUND UP: Indonesian president urges Aceh not to dwell on the past, 2001).   
 
2.4.3. Tensions Reducing Measures 
Mitchell defines tension reducing measure as: 
Concrete moves or statements made to avoid or reduce the dangers arising from 
situations of crisis or confrontation (usually involving coercive force) which have a 
high probability of escalating towards new levels of violence…In many cases, TRMs 
are usually employed prior to concessions in that they are assumed to be necesary to 
remove generally debilitating feelings and attitudes from a target and to enable that 
party's leaders to recognize other forms of conciliatory gestures, which may later 
include some clear concessions. (Mitchell, 2000). 
Tension reducing attempts for preventing confrontation between parties can be seen in 
the Aceh and Kurdish conflicts. In the Kurdish conflict for example at 2005 Newroz 
celebrations some chıldren burned the Turkish flag which caused incredible reaction 
all around the Turkey. All around the Turkey people waved Turkish flags at their 
apartment and even demonstrated in important city centers. The condemnation of the 
action by Turkish and Pro-Kurdish party leaders reduced the tension and prevented it 
to transform to violence (Milliyet, 2005).  
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2.4.4. Confidence Building Measure 
By confidence building measures, it means unilateral action to diminish, abandon, or 
removing some means of destructive damage on a target, or demonstrating its 
unwillingness to use such means. 
 
The state leader and organization leaders on build confidence among each other to 
diminish mistrust and to create trust that it will less likely to use unpleasant action by 
its side towards other party side such as military operations by the state and attack by 
other party member fighters (Mitchell, 2000). Hence the more there is remove of threat 
removed against other side, it will be more the target side prone to confidence building 
measures (Mitchell, 2000).  
 
2.5. Processes for Peace-building between Leaders 
For building peace roles, functions, and activities with right people, skills, materials, 
and resources are important. For building peace relationship existence between 
conflicting groups is important ending point for understanding the system and each 
other. Relationship between these groups contributes the reconciliation and vice versa. 
Engagement of the conflicting group and continued relations takes it to the “encounter” 
the past mistakes without locked into the vicious circle of mutual exclusion that is fed 
by past. Through reconciliation encounter to the past and hopes for future can be 
settled.  Envisioning the future through reconciliation frames our presents talks and 
propensity to conflict-ending solutions (Lederach, 1999). 
 
Pruitt and Kim (2004) define the decision-making process in the conflict with regard 
to dual concern model. On this model there are concern about other’s outcomes and 
concern about party’s outcomes emerges as two important variables. By concern about 
party’s concerns, or self-concern, it means that the party place more importance to its 
interest rather than other’s interest in the realm of dispute. By other’s concern party 
instead of concerning its interest, rather it gave more interest for other’s interest and 
feel responsibility for other’s outcomes (Pruitt & Kim, 2004). In the Kurdish and Aceh 
conflicts the mitigations of the states starts when they accepts the responsibilities of 
the mistakes in past and shows responsibility for the rise of violence in the conflict 
(McDonald, 1999; Hurriyet Daily News, One Kurdish rebel dead and two wounded in 
souheast Turkey, 2005g). Negotiation occurs at this situation when parties come 
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together to resolve diversities on their interest through conversation (Pruitt & Kim, 
Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, 2004).  As we can see on the 
Figure 2.2, yielding is encouraged when party has not interests for itself but more 
concerning about other’s outcomes. Contending is encouraged when the party is more 
concerning about one’s own outcome while less on other’s outcomes (Pruitt & Kim, 
Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, 2004; Klimesova, 2016). 
Avoiding to show itself when there is not any interest of the party for outcomes of 
itself and other’s outcomes (Pruitt & Kim, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and 
Settlement, 2004).  
 
Problem solving is encouraged when the party has concerns about its and other’s 
outcomes (Pruitt & Kim, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, 
2004). Problem solving based on joint efforts of party leaders to find mutually 
acceptable solution (Klimesova, 2016). They exchange information, the goals of each 
other and commonalities of interests and conflicting interests (Bar-Tal, 2013; Pruitt & 
Kim, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, 2004). The open meeting 
between party leaders may cause loose of the prestige in the eyes of the group members 
and leaders could fear that such openness could be an advantage for other and means 
loose of advantage for oneself. So that leaders could choose private talks and meetings 
among each other so that they can prevent to lose of prestige. Because of transparency 
of the meeting, leaders could prefer play to the audience instead of reveal real issues. 
For example in the Aceh and Kurdish cases there were closed-door meetings and 
communications between GAM - GoI leaders and the Turkish government-PKK 
leaders and pro-Kurdish party deputies (Xinhua General News Service, 2005).    
 
Problem-solving succeeded there are three possible result from that: conflict 
management, settlement, and conflict resolution (Mitchell, 2014; Bar-Tal, 2013; Pruitt 
& Kim, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, 2004). In the conflict 
management party leaders look ways to de-escalate conflict. Cease-fire is an example 
of the conflict management in which it is aimed to make symbolic gestures to other 
parties to start procedural agreements (Mitchell, 2000; Pruitt & Kim, Social Conflict: 
Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, 2004; Druckman, 1994). At settlement, party 
leaders show themselves on substantive agreements and they are willing to give up 
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using violent means. At conflict resolution, if the parties are close to the end of the 
conflict and the level parties come up makes easily successful.  
 
Developing a common vocabulary with other group leaders helps is a key for 
successful problem solving. As mentioned before, dismantling former structure of 
belief that is based on conflict and creates new belief structure which is creates 
common ground for both party groups, their members, and leaders’ helps continuation 
of problem solving (Bar-Tal, 2013; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Pruitt & Kim, Social 
Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, 2004).  Besides, in a conflict each side 
can interpret same event in a total contradictory way (Cobb, 2003). Each parties’ 
narratives to the conflict, if there is totally conflicting narratives, then it becomes 
difficult task for party leaders to construct new narrative for encompassing former 
narratives. Thus, the Acehnese and Kurdish rebel fighters explain their attacks as a 
defense to a colonial state, which aims to destroy their culture. On the other hand, the 
state explains their military operations by claiming guaranteeing security of its land 
and prevent rebellion activities which cause chaos (Meitzner, 2006). To make 
narratives of both sides closer, party leaders use conciliatory gestures to show them 
they understand their narratives and welcome other leaders to dialogue about their 
narratives towards each other (Mitchell, 2000; Pruitt D. G., 1997; Pruitt & Kim, Social 
Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, 2004). A step towards conflict 
resolution occurs when parties reached a common narrative about their cultures and 
the events (Rothman, 1997). Intractable conflicts are also related with metaphors, by 
that means what kind of labels used by party leaders towards other groups are defining 
factor for flexibility of conflict to resolution or not (Pruitt & Kim, Social Conflict: 
Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, 2004). For example, labels for the PKK and 
GAM fighters “terrorist” caused break of relations between parties and caused mistrust 
against state authorities. Also, the usage of “colonialists” by Kurdish and Acehnese 
leaders cause negative attitude towards them by state leaders (McDonald, 1999) These 
negative metaphors or label at first level prevents negotiations and unbiased and 
optimist path. Pruitt lists conditions for problem solving: faith in one’s own problem 
solving ability, momentum, availability of a mediator, and trust (Pruitt D. G., 2002).  
This model assumes that individuals will find all of the strategies attractive for their 
concerns, depending on the situations the actors are surrounded by. Some conditions 
affect self-concern and concern for other leaders. These conditions are conditions 
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affecting self -concern, self-concern in groups and conditions affecting the other’s 
concerns. With regard to conditions affecting self-concern, high self-concern emerges 
when party inclines to contending and problem solving instead of yielding and 
avoiding. On this level some determinants can be taken into consideration. For 
example, interests at the stake for the party is one of the determinant of the actions of 
the party. In the Kurdish case, top leaders of the PKK saw that demanding an 
independent Kurdish state is more on their interest and the circumstances they are 
surrounded helps them to think that they have right to defend an independent Kurdish 
state. 
 
Figure 2.2. Pruitt's Dual concern model (Pruitt & Kim, Social Conflict: Escalation, 
Stalemate, and Settlement, 2004) 
 
While in the past they were prone under the Turkish nation state, now they amplify an 
independent Kurdish state. The decision of the top leaders of the PKK determines the 
interests of the part (the Kurdish community) and the relations with the Turkish state. 
Their self-concern is now more based on an independent autonomous Kurdish state 
comparing with recent year. In the Aceh case on the other hand, party saw that their 
interest is more based on waiving an independent Aceh state. In the past they defined 
their interest around an independent Aceh states and their attitudes emerged on that 
concern. But party saw that this preference is not anymore for their interest and 
collapsing with other’s interest, party changed its preferences by negotiating with other 
party and taking into consideration other’s concern outcomes.  
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Another determinant here is that party does not have any more energy or time to 
continue on resisting on that interest, so it cannot pursue all the interests it demands. 
For example, on the Aceh case GAM leaders after the tsunami natural disaster noticed 
that, they did not have intense power to pursue referendum for independent state since 
tsunamı at first level destroyed all the Acehnese residential areas and caused huge 
death tolls. Because of the fact of too much death in Acehnese settlements after the 
tsunami, leaders were aware that there was decrease support of the Acehnese society 
for independent movement (AFP, Indonesian president orders troops to end offensive 
in Aceh, 2005). 
 
Parties’ attitudes are also defined by how they framed the interests for each other. For 
example, there is a worker in a company who wants to gain 15$ per hour while the 
current payment to the worker is 13$ per hour. But employee wants to give 14$ per 
hour for worker. If the worker sees the 1$ as a loss from 15$ expectation, it is negative 
frame. But if worker see 1$ as a gain from 13$ to 14$, it is positive framing. Here the 
frame given by the parties to the circumstance is defining factor for the continuation 
of the relations between parties. For example, on the Acehnese case, formerly military 
leaders saw the relations with GAM leaders as a loss, since they defined this attitude 
as a loss of prestige on the eyes of the society and giving upper hand to the “terrorist” 
GAM leaders and legitimizing them via starting dialogue with them. But after change 
of the leaders and coming of the determinant leaders, state leader-labelled relations 
with GAM leaders as positive frame by accepting that through negotiations with GAM 
leaders they can reach on overlapping of the interest and can find means to end of the 
conflict. On the one hand from the perspective of GAM leaders formerly they were 
also against the dialogue process with government authorities unless there was there 
was acceptance of referendum for an Aceh state. They saw the acceptance of the 
dialogue with government leaders as loss of success and government’s success over 
Acehnese and particularly on GAM. So they made on negative framing on relations 
with state authorities. But after the tsunami disaster, GAM accepted to start dialogues 
with state authorities without insisting on referendum for an independent Aceh state, 
they saw this dialogue as an opportunity to end long-standing conflict between two 
parties. So we can see that at the post-tsunami era both sides put positive framing on 
relation with each other.  
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In the Kurdish case, government authorities always rejected to start dialogue with the 
PKK and particularly with Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK. It was claimed 
that through starting dialogue or negotiations with PKK leaders there will space for 
legitimizing the PKK. Moreover, state authorities claimed that there is no Kurdish 
problem in Turkey, so that by starting negotiations with the PKK, it means there is a 
Kurdish problem in Turkey. Turkish state leaders defined negative frame with relations 
others, PKK leaders. But after Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Prime Minister term, he 
accepted the existence of the Kurdish problem and crated dialogue path between state 
authorities and PKK leaders. Erdogan at some of his statements did not see any 
problem with negotiations with PKK leaders. After Erdogan’s leadership in Turkey 
we witness the positive frame of the state authorities towards relations with PKK 
leaders and PKK leader Ocalan who is in jail at Imrali island. Also military at first 
stand against negotiations with PKK leaders as legitimizing the PKK “terrorist” 
organization and saw it only with regard to security problem. After Erdogan’s 
leadership military changes its stance towards the Kurdish problem and they abstained 
to stand against negotiations of state authorities with PKK leaders. Parallel to state 
leadership positive framing we saw positive framing on the side of the military from 
negative framing. With regard to PKK leadership they formerly insisting on relations 
with Turkish state and the PKK’s founding declaration shows that the PKK was 
founded with the aim of an independent Kurdish state. So that they saw the Turkish 
state as colonialist state which exploiting Kurdish society. So PKK leadership put 
negative framing on relations with Turkish state. But after capture of the PKK founder 
and prominent leader Ocalan, organization changed its rhetoric and showed its 
willingness towards state authorities. The positive framing towards state took the place 
of negative framing. Moreover, fear of confrontation decreases self-concern of the 
party. When there is possibility of joint problem solving and contending of the parties 
on the problem, the possibilities of the confrontation increases. At this moment parties 
redefine their position towards each other to decrease possibility of harsh 
confrontation. This is well known on the couple confrontation (Fry, Firestone, & 
Williams, 1983). In the newly couples such sentiments block the assertiveness of the 
one on each other since one does not know the other’s feelings, which cause decrease 
of the contentious and problem solving behavior (Pruitt & Kim, 2004; Fry et al., 1983). 
From this perspective, in the Aceh example GAM leaders did not believe in GoI’s aim 
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and abstain to show mitigated attitudes to adversary state authorities (AFP, Indonesia, 
Aceh separatist group rapped for truce violations, 2003b).  
 
Self-concern in group is also determinant factor on attitudes. The representatives of 
the group inclined to be less willing to negotiate with other since they have psychology 
of representing their group members. Because of this feeling, representatives of the 
community become tougher than normally at individual level they could accept 
conditions given by other party (Druckman, 1994). The effect of this feeling of 
responsibility towards the group when representative know that group constituents are 
prone to compromise (Benton & Druckman, 1974). In the case of Aceh for example, 
Indonesian society’s willing and demand from the state to resolution of the Aceh 
conflict resembled on the speeches of the Indonesian leaders and president candidates 
at election campaigns. On the other hand, in the Kurdish case societies started to show 
more pressure on government to solve the Kurdish case and this pushed government 
leaders to solve the Kurdish problem. Contrarily in some cases, the behaviors from the 
Kurdish groups that triggers nationalist sentiments of Turkish citizens causes changes 
of rhetoric of the Turkish leader and using more violent means on the issue. For 
example, at Newroz festival in 2005, Kurdish group member burned Turkish flag This 
incident triggered nationalist sentiments among Turkish society and caused path to 
dialogue between Kurdish and Turkish parties. Military leaders declined the incident 
with harsh criticisms. On the other hand the language used by government leader 
Erdogan helped to decrease the tension and also criticism from The Kurdish party 
leaders helped the situation to stay under control and prevented it to cause violence 
(Milliyet, Provokasyon, 2005). 
 
Conditions Affecting Other Party one of other property to helps mitigation of conflict 
between the parties. High concern with other party makes parties to behave yielding 
and problem solving attitudes towards each other instead of contending and avoiding 
each other. Concerning about other party is developed by various kinds of 
interpersonal relationships such as friendship and love (Zubek et al., 1992). These 
kinds of sources induce empathy towards each other. Besides, putting oneself into 
other party’s shoes helps the development of empathy between leaders (Pruitt & Kim, 
Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, 2004). For example on both 
cases of the Aceh and Kurdish conflicts, state leaders accepted past mistakes and they 
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said these mistakes by the state triggered hatred and aggression of ethnic group 
members towards authority (AFP, Indonesian president arrives for first visit to 
troubled Aceh, 2000c; Çakir, 2011a).  
 
2.6. Peace-Building 
Peace-building starts when society members notice that it is time to use violent means 
to get solution, instead use of dialogue should be processed (Bar-Tal, 2013). Leaders 
should notice that these two confronting parties can be future partners that creates 
culture or new structure that accelerate peace process and belief of living together 
peacefully (Bar-Tal, 2013). This process reflects itself from individual member group 
to top leaders in different way. But on this process the leaders of the parties are 
important figures. Their views on the conflict, changing perception from mistrust to 
trust to other party leaders, and from pessimism to optimist perception for the future 
of dialogue with regard to reach peaceful agreement define are the determinant factors 
for de-escalation of the conflict. Also parties should come to table that they are open 
to compromise about what they want and “their red lines” (Pruitt & Kim, 2004; 
Gawerc, 2006). The parties at first level may come limited negotiation agreements, 
stop violent attacks as a conciliatory gesture to other party could be used. This process 
has ups and downs, so it takes time (Bar-Tal, 2013; Mitchell, 2000). This new structure 
based on relations between parties, conciliatory gestures, and many of negotiation 
process itself may help the change of perception of the society member lives under the 
intractable conflict and prejudices could takes its place to mutual understanding and 
mitigation of the members towards each other. For example, when the Kurdish 
Initiative declared by Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, there was not even acceptance 
of the existence of the Kurdish problem, and there was vehement opposition from the 
Turkish society towards Turkish government’s approach to Kurdish conflict. But after 
continuation of this statements from Turkish leadership and willingness of the state 
leader to end conflict changed stance of public from opposition to support of the 
support the peace process (Hurriyet Daily News, No retreat from Kurdish move, says 
PM, 2009) 
 
Peace-building regards the efforts of the society members, organizations, institutions, 
and agents to continue communication with past adversary to create new structure for 
peace. At peace-building process, peacemaking is important phase which focuses on 
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the mutual agreement between adversaries to end the intractable conflict (Zartman, 
Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques (Rev. ed.), 2007). 
This change starts with change attitude of the leaders toward negotiation. Leaders to 
guarantee peace on societal level, they spread the information with regard to end 
conflict and make society members to believe that through peaceful means conflict 
could end. So by construction new belief system and its acceptance by the society 
members helps the success of the peace (Bar-Tal, Intractable Conflicts: Socio-
Psychological Foundations and Dynamics, 2013). Generally conflict resolution 
appears with emergence of pact between adversaries which satisfies basic needs and 
goals of the parties (Bar-Tal, Intractable Conflicts: Socio-Psychological Foundations 
and Dynamics, 2013). Obviously, the change of the structure that prevents peace and 
way for negotiation is difficult task. A leader’s first difficulty is changing this culture 
of conflict to culture of peace. At ıntractable conflicts where there is mutual hurting 
stalemate between parties and they understand that they could not winner at this 
intractable conflict for both sides (Mitchell, 2014; Zartman, Peacemaking in 
International Conflict: Methods and Techniques (Rev. ed.), 2007). But since there 
longevity of the conflict, there was constructed prejudice, mistrust, and despair to other 
side make harder the task of the party leaders (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Fry, 
Firestone, & Williams, 1983). According to Bar-Tal (2013), the reason for difficulty 
of the acceptance of this idea initiated by state leaders for new phase is because this 
idea seen as instigating belief. Because this instigating belief pushes society members 
to accept new structure and construct new belief to other group members. But here the 
successful process and construction of the “other” group identity to their members 
accelerate the emergence of culture of peace. This instigating belief should be based 
on the high validity and sources, so that members could be pushed easily to change 
their attitudes and reconcile with other group members (Bar-Tal, Intractable Conflicts: 
Socio-Psychological Foundations and Dynamics, 2013). It does not mean that 
everyone in a society will stand against the new belief. Some can absorb this new idea 
easily and from their experiences with other group members or impacts of the conflict 
on them could lead them to push state leaders for approaching mediators for changing 
structure of state leaders. The trust-building actions by the rival is important factor 
contributing to peace-building. This trust-building action change other party member’s 
character, intention, and goals. This also helps to heal the view of the other party’s 
perception of the group as evil and intransigent. (Bar-Tal, Intractable Conflicts: Socio-
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Psychological Foundations and Dynamics, 2013; Mitchell, 2000). For example, the 
conciliatory gesture of Anwar Sadat towards Israel resulted in perception of Israelis 
towards Arabs. Before visit of Sadat to Israel, more than 70% Israelis attributed Arabs 
aim was to annihilate Israel. But after the visit this thought diminished to less than 
50% (Bar-Tal, Intractable Conflicts: Socio-Psychological Foundations and Dynamics, 
2013; Mitchell, 2000). After the tsunami disaster the help of the GoI to the Aceh 
region, which was mostly devastated by the natural disaster and the statement of the 
Indonesian government leader to start communication with GAM leaders created the 
trust between leaders and hope for the success of the peace again. After the tsunami 
disaster there were pressures of the Muslim communities to start talks with 
government. But the GAM believed that Yudhoyono has a plan to destroy Aceh 
(Burrell, Australian Financial Review, 2005). But this mistrust was evaporated by 
informal communications and strengthening of the gentleman’s agreement between 
two sides. This development followed by formal meetings in Finland (Brummitt, 
Associated Press International, 2005). To claim higher position on other side and aim 
to oppress its rival to accept all of its demand and condition will not lead us to the 
peace. The acceptance of the adversary as an equal partner with whom based on 
legitimizing, equalizing, differentiating, and personalizing the other party (Bar-Tal & 
Teichman, 2005).  
 
Legitimization: It starts when state accept adversary group leader as acceptable and 
behaving within some norms. This factor occurs through willingness of the rival group 
to use alternative means to the violent ones. This recognition of other group comes out 
with acceptance of other groups’ religion, race, ideology, nationality, values, and some 
other differences that caused conflict (Bar-Tal, 2013). This legitimization is a 
conciliatory gesture to adversary which help development of trust between the two 
sides (Mitchell, 2000).  
 
Equalization: By equalization adversaries see each other equal and they reestablish 
relation on the structure. The past relations delegitimize at this level and this influence 
the attitudes of the parties towards each other. Since they see in each, the one who 
insists on one factor to be established could ease its demand and at some point could 
give from that demands. This psychological effect of equalization can be seen on state–
ethnic group conflicts. 
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Trust: Trust between groups is one of important determinant for the success of the 
conflict resolution. Trust enhance expectation about future behaviors of adversary 
group and its leader and reflects its own behavior and vice versa (Bar-Tal, 2013). 
Positive behavior of the rival leader increase the capability of the leaders to talk about 
every problem easily and this positive development decrease the psychological 
pressure on leaders. This trust relations between leaders could reflect on society 
members slowly. But here the determination of state leaders for conflict resolution 
push group members to change their perceptions. The attribution of positive intentions 
to rival leader with high capability leads to high level of trust among them (Kramer & 
Carnevale, 2001). This rust is important indicator for the Aceh and Kurdish conflicts 
for initiation of the negotiations.  
 
When there is growing trust to the adversary party, there is also developing of the 
expectation of future behavior of one another. Parallel to trust, parties started to figure 
out that there will social and moral orders followed by the parties, Because of the 
gestures given by party to decrease mistrust, party obliged to act in a role in which 
aims to continue the trust development of other party and with interaction guarantee 
that they will keep in that way (Barber, 1983; Mitchell, 2000). According to Mitchell 
(2000), activities instead of focusing develop trust at intractable conflict structure, they 
should focus on mistrust reducing. He explains by using principles and practices to 
reduce mistrust between parties it is better to bear in mind the components of trust: 
predictability, benevolent. By the Figure 2.3, he has idea that trust and mistrust, both 
involve benevolent and predictability dimensions (Mitchell, 2000).  
 
39 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Expectation of Trusting Parties and Mistrusting Parties (Mitchell, 2000) 
 
In case A1, there is wholly malevolent and the one is absolutely predictable about 
other’s malevolency. In case D2, adversary party is seen malevolent and the 
predictability about its behavior is turns from predictability to unpredictability. In this 
level, the trusted side turns into indifferent towards the thruster. In case C3, party 
started to become benevolent on behavior of another party but there is still doubt about 
its attitudes. In case B4, party becomes highly benevolent and predictable about 
behavior and attitudes of other party. Mitchell, concludes that all parties aimed to come 
to B4 from A2 by following X1-X2 track (Mitchell, 2000).  
 
Hope: It is hope that liberates people from their fixed irreconcilability of the conflict 
to the conciliated ways to resolve conflict. It gives opportunity for members of the 
groups and leaders that there alternative to the past and present, future is waiting for 
them to change the structure and creates new culture of peace. In the Aceh and Kurdish 
conflict cases, both state leaders mentioned mistakes in the past and recommended 
adversary group leaders to start new phase through dialogue (AFP, 2002i; Çakir, 
2011a) So hope and forgiveness are in some perspectives interrelated. For the hope 
about the conflict resolution there should be forgiveness of the rival leader and their 
mistakes in the past since they can create prejudices and negative stereotypes against 
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other group and leaders (Hartwell, 1999). Besides, this mistakes could stir fear of 
leaders to think that other party leaders could deceive them.  
 
2.6.1. Perspective Taking and Empathy 
By perspective taking it means the recognition of the other group’s members or leaders 
goal, aims, intentions, aspirations, needs, feelings, while on the other hand empathy 
refers to an effective response to the other person and experiencing what other feels 
(Bar-Tal, 2013; Batson & Ahmad, 2009). Perspective is an attitude of put oneself in 
other’s shoes. Perspective is imagining other’s dreams and understanding it. Empathy, 
on the other hand, is an emotional response which stems from this comprehension of 
the other (Batson & Ahmad, 2009).  
 
Building Peace: Bar-Tal (2013) defines building peace is a process as:  
mutual recognition and acceptance after the reconciliation process, whose supreme 
goal is the maintenance of peaceful relations characterized by full normalization with 
cooperation in all possible domains of collective life that provide secure and trustful 
coexistence (Bar-Tal, 2013). 
At peace-building process there should be changes of school textbooks, worldviews, 
leader’s speeches, books, films, and mass media. So peace-building occurs with 
change of socio-psychological structure of the majority of the society members and to 
the new cultural belief (Bar-Tal, 2013; Lederach, 1999). Construction of this new 
socio-psychological structure would transform relation with former adversary group 
into peaceful resolution (Bar-Tal, 2013).   
 
2.7. Peace Culture 
In 1998, UN General Assembly proposed eight bases for culture of peace (UN, 1998):  
 education for the peaceful resolution of conflict and maintaining peace 
 sustainable development (viewed as eradication of poverty, reduction of 
inequalities, and environmental sustainability) 
 human rights 
 gender equality 
 democratic participation 
 understanding  
 tolerance 
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 solidarity (among peoples) 
 participatory communication and the free flow of information 
 international peace and security, 
 
Apart from this Bar-Tall adds: mutual trust, justice, considering other party’s interests, 
needs, and goals, equality, and acceptance of other’s differences and respect to them 
(Bar-Tal, 2013). For achieving a culture of peace both parties should be aware of the 
value of the peace, and to show willingness to and work to reach peace. They also 
should be aware that to end intractable conflict peaceful means help to achieve that. 
Both former adversaries should come on ground that they have commonalities that 
helps them to commit to sitting around the table to talk about peace and should be 
optimistic that through these conciliatory gestures and talks they can construct culture 
of peace. Moreover, after this epistemic bases and dismantle of socio-psychological 
barriers between party leaders, there is need to export this belief to society members 
(Mitchell, 2000; Bar-Tal, 2013). Both adversary groups and their leaders require 
mutual knowledge about each other. The more they know each other in terms of 
cultural, identical based, religious, and historical grounds; the more they would 
understand reasons of other party leader’s insistence on some rights and can figure out 
in what regards they could give up of insisting on some demand from adversary party 
leaders (Bar-Tal, 2013). By accepting each other’s views, I mean not as a concession 
but acceptance as its existence, pave the way for a way for talking. Because by 
rejection the existence other party’s view such as through disregarding the demand 
addressing to oneself, leaders at first level closed the doors for hopes to culture of 
peace. So through mutual acceptance of their existence as opponent and their views 
opposed to each other, there is elimination of negative stereotype and instead foster 
positive attitude toward other group and its leader (Bar-Tal, 2013). So through this 
acceptance, mutual understanding and perspective taking of other’s needs, goals, 
values, traditions, and experiences. Relations between parties based on equality also 
cultivate the optimism for the development of peace. This is generally acceptable for 
asymmetric parties in which one is dominant to other. In this kind of cases, there is 
less hope for peace since the asymmetric power relations cause pressure of the 
dominant party leader to be seen by weaker one as party who is pro-violence and less 
concern about human rights violations and less respect for differences and 
commonalities. Contrarily, the source of the mistrust and despair for the conflict 
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resolution can be weaker party leader instead of dominant party. For example, in the 
Kurdish case, Turkish government leader Erdogan opened the Kurdish initiative for 
the resolution of long-standing conflict. Pro-Kurdish parties, intellectuals, and the state 
called for disarmament of the PKK organization for positive negotiation between 
parties in a sensitive conflict atmosphere. Instead of reply that demand from different 
parties, the PKK approached declaration of unilateral cease-fire (Hurriyet Daily News, 
2005ae) This approach eliminated trust of the state leader to the PKK and became 
doubtful about intentions of PKK leaders. This with other incidents influenced 
willingness of the state’s decision to whether continue or not. 
 
2.8. Conclusion 
On this chapter the leadership factor on the conflict resolution is analyzed. The leaders, 
especially top level leaders of adversary groups/parties, have determinant decisive 
attitudes and decisions on the developments of the conflict to peace phase. By giving 
some incidents from both the Aceh and Kurdish cases, the leaders of state and 
organizations reflects their impacts on the transformation of these conflicts. It is 
analyzed that leaders in a conflict situation can have power of transforming the 
conflict. Leaders by using their charismatic and institutional power change the 
structure of the conflict and constructed social barrier between members of the 
adversary group through leading the negotiation process and showing willingness to 
end the hatred and animosity between these groups. Trust, confidence, and willingness 
of the leaders are important factors for continuation of the dialogue between 
protagonists. Consent of the one party leader to other for starting talks instead of 
continuing violent means and conciliatory gestures between leaders’ important steps 
that ease tension and helps to forget past trauma and star new phase of the talks 
independent from past relations. Besides, between state and insurgent leaders since 
there is asymmetric power relations, this situation of asymmetry cause limit of the 
bargaining space between adversary state and rebel leaders (Zartman, 1995). So 
insurgent leaders because of this structure tend to use violent means to get their 
demand and tend to flex one’s muscles with the aim of guaranteeing other side it is 
powerful enough to stand against state repression. Hence, at intractable conflicts 
insurgents’ groups are more prone to approach conflict as zero-sum game and less 
willing to accept face-to-face bargaining over table. To sum up, the trust between 
leaders, forgiving the past mistakes, conciliatory gestures, accepting adversary group 
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leaders as representative of the society, empathy, hope for peaceful end, accepting 
mistakes in the past, and giving concessions to find common ground are important 
determinant factors for conflict resolution (Bar-Tal, 2013; Mitchell, 2000; Pruitt & 
Kim, 2004; Benton & Druckman, 1974). The more leaders use these instruments the 
more possibility of the conflict resolution and peace building between adversary 
parties.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE ACEH CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION 
 
In this chapter the Aceh case will be analyzed through discourse analysis of the leaders. 
To elaborate this, in newspapers statements of the insurgent group leaders, related 
party members on the one hand, state leaders and their statements analyzed with regard 
of how their attitudes changes the structure of the conflict and what is important 
between leaders for conflict resolution. In the Aceh case around 160 news articles from 
newspapers elaborated between 1999 and 2005. The reason for these dates are Suharto 
regime ends in 1998 and first time democratic system took place in Indonesia. By 
spring of democracy elected leaders’ policies towards changes unlike Suharto who 
used military operation to end insurgency in the Aceh region. After 1999 there were 
some trials of peace talks and meetings between GoI leaders and insurgent group 
leaders. But it was failed. Finally, in 2005 with presidency of Yudhoyono, the Aceh 
conflict ends. Throughout 160 news articles between these dates, this chapter aims to 
reveal reasons of the failure of the former test and impact of the behavior and decisions 
of the leaders in terms of the failure of those former trials. Besides, it is also aims to 
elaborate the core attitudes or change of perception of the leaders that pave the way 
for conflict resolution. By take into consideration of the top-level leadership on peace 
building process failed former trials is compared with succeeded negotiation process.  
On the following chapters the Aceh and Kurdish conflicts will be elaborated differently 
and on the conclusion of this thesis there will be comparative interpretation of these 
two cases. From this analysis, the importance of the leaders and their role on start of 
the dialogue, how changes of the perception of adversary leaders defines future of the 
intractable conflict and what kind of steps and steps should be followed by leaders 
aimed to shown.  
 
3.1. The Aceh Conflict 
On the Aceh conflict to do discourse analysis of GoI leaders on the one hand, GAM 
leaders on the other hand. To do that, I searched newspaper printed in English about 
the Aceh conflict, and between 1999 and 2005 relevant news taken to study interest. I 
specifically focused on the 2002-2005 period. The peace process efforts started with 
Megawati after she came to office in July 2001. She several times visited Aceh 
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province and promised to finish long-standing conflict. During her office time, there 
were talks and meeting between state officials and GAM peace negotiators. After 
round meetings, the efforts for ending conflict failed and conflict violence took the 
platform again. Hence, there were twenty news articles from 1999, four news articles 
from 2000, eight news articles in 2001, twenty news articles from 2002, thirty-four 
news articles from 2003, twenty news articles from 2004, and twenty-five news articles 
from 2005 were elaborated. These numbers itself showed that, the more there was 
propensity of the state leader for negotiation and dialogue, the more news about 
conflict and hope from society emerges. When state leader speaks about alternative to 
military means, since it takes different path from all time used routine methods, news 
about conflict and statements of leaders took more consideration and places on the 
newspapers. So that, for my research I analyzed text from newspaper articles, 
statements of the leaders with regard to conflict and about adversary insurgent group 
and its leaders. For better interpretation I compared developments of the conflict and 
the transformations and key moments which are related with leaders and their 
statements. On the Table 1 it is listed codes to analyze the Aceh conflict and their 
frequency in time period listed differently. For example, in 1999 the frequency of the 
“Independence” demands by GAM is twelve, and it is equal to 24% of all codes listed 
for 1999. While in 1999 frequency of “independence” is that high, it decreases to 1% 
in 2005. Here it is important to mention who was the president at the time period that 
is mentioned on the Table 1. Between 21 May 1998 and 20 October 1999 Bacharuddin 
Jusuf Habibie was president of The Indonesia (GoI). Habibie was succeeded by 
Abdrurrahman Wahid who ruled GoI between 20 October 1999 and 23 July 2001. 
After him, his vice president Megawati Sukarnoputri elected as president of Indonesia. 
She ruled GoI between 23 July 2001 and 20 October 2004. At her presidency time, in 
August 2000, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was appointed the Coordinating Minister 
for Politic and Security Affairs. Yudhoyono became president of the Indonesia in 20 
October 2004 and stayed at office until 20 October 2014. Since then, the 1999-time 
period shows us frequency of the codes that used by both Habibie and Wahid. While 
in 2001, codes are about both Wahid and Megawati’s statements, 2004 is codes related 
with the statements and policies of the both Megawati and Yudhoyono. 
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3.1.1. Periods of Presidents and the Aceh Conflict 
3.1.1.1. 1999-2001: Habibie and Wahid Periods 
3.1.1.1.1. Year 1999 
Habibie was president at office between 21 May 1998 and 20 October 1999. After him 
Wahid took the office and his presidency continued until 21 July 2001. Here it is aimed 
to elaborate the 1999 discourse analysis of the leaders from the news collected and by 
choosing October 1999 since there was change of president, it is aimed to show 
whether there are differences from the news collection. By this my aim is to interpret 
impact of two different leaders on the Aceh conflict.  
 
There was strong demand from society with regard to the referendum. For example, in 
March 1999 newspaper, Aceh’s governor who formerly supported a great separation 
of Aceh from Java accepted possibility of federated state if the Acehnese would 
receive percentage of the profits from its natural resources. Habibie in March 1999 
made a visit after submission of accepting the proposal from Aceh for autonomy 
(Kearney, 1999a). In the newspapers we can understand from the statement of the 
Aceh governor and some other politicians that there is mistrust to the gestures of the 
GoI. The Acehnese politician thinks that these are “all only talks” (Kearney, 1999a). 
So, this lack of confidence and trust to adversary group cause the Acehnese to not be 
optimistic about the conciliatory gestures of the state leaders. In 1999, GAM decided 
to boycott the elections and demanded a referendum in the region. Even it became 
slogan on the streets too. The insistence on this demand is a clear proof of the 
Zartman’s claim that in insurgent group-state conflict there are asymmetric relations; 
so that weaker insurgent group will be prone to more resistance on its demands and 
harder to change their attitudes (Zartman, 1995). GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Free 
Aceh Movement) demanded a referendum before the election, but the state rejected it 
and local election took place without the referendum demanded by the Acehnese. In 
reply, the Acehnese boycotted the election. Both sides flexed their muscles towards 
each other and they insisted on mitigation. One of the reasons for insistence of the 
GAM for referendum is a declaration of the GoI that there could be grant of 
independence to East Timor (Madanir, 1999). Besides, the continued military 
operations caused Acehnese and GAM leaders to question sincerity of the GoI. Since 
there were military operations to Aceh region and violence was common in the region, 
for GAM leaders to trust to the state authority, they could not find a place in the region. 
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Moreover, before the October presidential elections, there were strong claims for the 
independence by GAM. They aimed to establish an Islamic state in the Aceh region 
(AFP, Groups set fire to schools and teacher's home in troubled Aceh, 1999).  Later 
we will see that, the claim of the referendum for independence in 1999 heightened 
especially with the June 7 elections. In May, GAM announced to the Acehnese people, 
they should boycott election in favor of referendum for self-determination (AFP, 
Groups set fire to schools and teacher's home in troubled Aceh, 1999). Besides, before 
the October Presidential election the demand of GAM for independence is visible from 
statements of GAM commanders to the press: “We're not Islamic fundamentalists or 
extremists. Our struggle is for national liberation. The military has come here to 
colonize us. We just want our country back” (McDonald, 1999). From this statement 
it is obvious that GAM leader labelled adversary group, the GoI, as a colonizer. 
Through this labelling, they justified their insurgency to the state and also it means that 
there is not possible place to trust the state. Because, by naming the state as a colonizer, 
they already showed that they come to Aceh to exploit their resources and took all of 
them for their interest. Since they are colonizer they do not care too much about human 
rights either. GAM demanded a referendum in the region for people in the region to 
decide on independence. This independence demand is well supported by their 
attitudes towards adversary state. They do not see any conciliatory gestures from the 
state to decrease insistence on independence and to open channels for negotiations. 
Contrarily what they see from other party (the state) is disrespect to their rights 
(McDonald, 1999). Because of this atmosphere of mistrust and closed channels for 
dialogue, the GoI leader, Habibie, apologized for mistakes in the past (Ibid.). This did 
not change cold shoulder of GAM instantly. For them that apology was not said 
sincerely and it was “just theater, pure drama” (McDonald, 1999).  
 
When we look at the Figure 3.1., there were not so many steps with regard to de-
escalation of the conflict. In 1999, President Habibie and continued similar policies 
about the Aceh conflict since there was influence of the military on the Aceh conflict. 
As Figure 3.1 shows that after Habibie, the successor President tried to use alternative 
ways on dealing with the Aceh conflict and some conciliatory gestures were put in 
practice (Figure 3.1). With the presidency of Wahid conciliatory gestures started to 
become more frequent than the former year. As from Figure 3.2 it is visible that the 
frequency of the conflict escalator moves decreased in later years after 1999.  
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Figure 3.1. Habibie (1998-1999) and Wahid President (1999-2001) Leadership 
Factor and Aceh Conflict- 1 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Habibie (1998-1999) and Wahid President (1999-2001) Leadership 
Factor and Aceh Conflict-2 
 
During 1999, violence was interrelated with military operations and GAM attacks. In 
the news people fed up of military operations to their villages in Aceh and also the 
GAM insisted on the withdraw of Indonesian army from Aceh province (Kearney, 
Autonomy not enough for Aceh?, 1999a; McDonald, 1999; AFP, Groups set fire to 
schools and teacher's home in troubled Aceh, 1999). The influence of GAM on the 
society demonstrated by people’s obedience to the general strike demand of GAM and 
closing all the shops for days (AFP, 1999h)  This military operation in the region 
nourished hatred towards state authority. From GAM leaders also we can see that there 
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was anger toward state authorities because of the military operations. Also the 
continued military operations and violence (AFP, 1999f) in the region (18% and 24%) 
pushed parties to be less hopeful for the future of the conflict and resulted in leaders 
to take decision in terms of unwillingness to conciliate with adversary leader (Pruitt 
D. G., 2002). Also since after the long standing Suharto dictatorship, Habibie was first 
elected president of the Indonesia. After a long time, the state showed conciliatory 
gestures to insurgent groups. Since these steps are taken at the pre-negotiation level, 
adversary group leaders were prone to make less concessions from their demands. 
Because of mistrust and continued violence (Tjahjadi, 1999) the insurgent leaders 
approached these steps in cautious way. As Mitchell mentions that concessions 
generally implements by the adversary groups at the peace process level where there 
is developing trust between party leaders and developing of the willingness for conflict 
resolution (Mitchell, 2000). Also as Pruitt (2014) showed by the dual concern model, 
peace will be succeeded at problem solving level in which party concern about both 
one’s and other party’s outcomes. At this level of the intention and confidence building 
steps there could be peace process. So since these confrontation of leaders generally 
occurred at war stage, there is not concern of the party leaders for each other from both 
the GoI leader and GAM leaders. Besides, although there were some calls for end of 
the violence in the region by the leaders of the organizations in the region and from 
GAM (Tjahjadi, 1999) , there were not positive response from the state and this caused 
increased mistrust towards the GoI, particularly towards President Habibie (Ibid.). The 
violence by the Indonesian military increased especially after East Timor was given 
right to decide for their future (Murdoch, 1999). The deployment of more troops to the 
Aceh, instead bringing stability to the region “…worsen[ed] the problem” (Ibid.). 
These situations and increased military troops in the region triggered Acehnese to 
questioning the intention of the GoI. Deployment of the troops and rejecting to start 
negotiation and dialogue with GAM rebel leaders (AFP, 1999g), instead of building 
trust between the parties and hope for the solution, they caused increase of tensions 
and unwillingness of GAM to make concessions. While the GoI deployed more troops 
in the region, on the other hand, East Timor’ independence triggered continuation of 
the fight by GAM.  Hence, GAM leaders started to declare to newspapers their 
willingness to make Aceh independent and continue to fight until they succeeded 
(Ganjanakhundee, 1999). These statements can be interpreted as reactionary 
discourses to the attitudes of the state, especially military operations. Zartman explains 
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this situation in terms of asymmetry: Since there is asymmetric power between 
insurgent group and state, the insurgent group prone to flex its muscles to adversary 
group to show that it is strong enough to resist against its behavior (Zartman, 1995).  
In the election on 20 October 1999, Wahid was elected as new President of the 
Indonesia. Abdurrahman Wahid has offered Aceh special autonomy. He has pledged 
to return 85 per cent of the wealth of the oil-and gas-rich province, rather than the 15 
per cent envisaged in a new law for the provinces. As mentioned the Aceh region is 
rich in accordance of natural resources. Aceh accounts third of liquid natural gas of 
Indonesia (The Irish Times, 1999). After the election there was first time a person of 
Acehnese origin became member of the cabinet (Ibid.). This is important conciliatory 
gesture by the new government who came to power in June 1999. Besides, like former 
the one, President Wahid, with his vice-President visited the Aceh region. He there 
promised people to allow referendum in Aceh whether people want independence or 
autonomy, and he promised to accept outcomes of the referendum. But the problem 
was that there was strong pressure from army and his cabinet to not allow referendum 
in the region (The Irish Times, 1999; AFP, 1999i)). On the other hand, the attitude of 
the exiled GAM leader was also determinant factor for future of the conflict. The exiled 
GAM leader, Hasan di Tiro, dismissed the demand of the President Wahid for starting 
of the dialogue between Aceh and Jakarta. He called this demand as “stupid” since 
“we don’t need it, we are independent” (The Irish Times, 1999). This attitude showed 
the unwillingness of GAM leader to start dialogue with the GoI. For positive 
communication between leaders how leaders identify or label each other is important. 
For example, GAM Commander called the Indonesian Presidents liars. (Kearney, 
1999b; The Irish Times, 1999). This kind of labels prevents optimism about conflict 
resolution and changing structure of the conflict to the new phase of the peace culture.  
Apart from that, the GoI lost his credibility on the eyes of the Acehnese. The army 
apologized for mistakes in the past and promised to withdraw, but little changed (AFP, 
1999g). Habibie promised to the Acehnese to investigate human rights violations done 
by the army. But there was not any progressive investigations (Murdoch, 1999; The 
Irish Times, 1999). Besides, Wahid promised for referendum but this promise was not 
later kept (Kearney, 1999b). These steps led to loss of the trust towards the GoI by 
GAM leaders and Acehnese society and this caused more negative images metaphors 
about the GoI.  
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From the Figure 3.3 we can see that “conflict escalation moves” frequencies are more 
than “conciliatory gestures” frequencies. In 1999, conflict escalator moves with 19 
frequencies occupied 49% of all area, on the other hand conciliatory gestures which 
are important for their contribution on starting dialogue occupied only 10% of the area. 
During that time Independence-Autonomy debate was also most frequent agenda of 
the leaders at that time (Figure 3.3).  
 
 
Figure 3.3. Aceh Conflict 1999; Independence-Autonomy debate (13) 33%, 
Conciliatory Gestures (4) with 10% and Conflict Escalation (19) with 49% 
 
From the Figure 3.4 also we can see that GAM did not trust the GoI for its future steps 
with regard to Aceh conflict resolution (X1).  In 1999 GAM saw that although there 
were few conciliatory gestures for conflict resolution, state was generally willing to 
continue its military operations. Because of GAM leaders were not optimistic and 
expected from the GoI to continue this attitude and behavior on future as well.  
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Figure 3.4. Expectation of Trust by parties 1999 
 
3.1.1.1.2. Year 2000 
When comes to 2000, the military operations to Aceh province continued. Moreover, 
in February 2000, exiled leader of GAM, Hasan di Tiro, and the GoI agreed to ceasefire 
(AFP, 2000a). This pre-negotiation steps helped adversary groups to start dialogue. 
The stop of fighting contributed the confidence building steps and it is sign of gesture 
for parties that they are willing to communicate and negotiate on the long-standing 
intractable conflict. This step later changed the attitude of GAM leaders towards the 
GoI and called state authorities to hold a dialogue (AFP, 2000b). When these steps 
were taken, President Wahid rejected the demand of GAM referendum for 
independence, rather referendum was allowed only for whether Acehnese wanted 
Islamic Law (Ibid.). After continued dialogues, the first formal cease-fire agreement 
between adversary groups was signed and this agreement was decided to be for three 
months (Moulson, 2000). This optimism for future of the conflict helped groups to 
come together. But for continuation of the talks in positive way, there should be 
common vocabulary between parties. Parties should use common vocabulary that 
creates outcomes for the interest of the both parties. Problem-solving of the conflict 
based on the adversary group’s concern not only for one’s outcomes and interests but 
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also for other’s outcomes too (Pruitt & Kim, 2004; Pruitt D. G., 2002). There are other 
conciliatory gestures followed by the leaders. For example, President Wahid visited 
the Aceh province on January 2000 first time after he was elected on October, 1999. 
There in his visit he marked hands of policemen and Muslim scholars with flour as a 
symbolic gesture to guarantee peace in Aceh (AFP, 2000c). But in the Aceh case, on 
the one hand GAM leaders declared that they would not give up from independence 
objective; on the other hand, President Wahid declared total rejection of demand of 
independence from insurgent group (Moulson, 2000).  
 
 
Figure 3.5. Aceh Conflict 2000; Conciliatory gestures (3) 30% and conflict escalator 
moves (1) 10% 
 
From Figure 3.5 we can see that compared to 1999 although frequencies decreased, 
conciliatory gestures became more dominant in 2000. Because of the cease-fire 
between GAM and GoI, the level of mistrust between them decreased and they started 
to use communication too as an alternative to military means. Since GAM did not 
renounce from its bid of independence the GoI did not insist on to continue dialogue 
with GAM leaders.  Also Figure 3.6 shows that compare to former years the mistrust 
level of the one to another decreased in 2000. As we can see from the Figure, GAM’s 
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trust level increased to D2 quadrant and total predictability of state’s future behavior 
and attitude turned into unpredictable level (X1). On the other hand, state’s mistrust 
level on GAM also improved to quadrant D2 (X2). But because of independence –
autonomy debate at this year, relations between adversary GAM and GoI did not take 
further steps. 
 
 
Figure 3.6. Expectation of trust by parties 2000 
 
3.1.1.2. 2001-2004: President Megawati and Aceh Conflict 
3.1.1.2.1. Year 2001 
When Megawati came to power on 23 July 2001, she also called for dialogue rather 
than violence in the region. She also declared that she would soon visit the Aceh region 
(Suwastoyo, 2001). She sent a conciliatory gesture, to the adversary group, GAM, by 
calling them for a dialogue.  At that time of her calling for a dialogue, the violence 
intensified in the region. President Megawati wanted to use dialogue as a path to 
conflict resolution. She met with representatives from the region and talked about 
special autonomy to the region. Besides, with the implementation of the law passed 
from the assembly Aceh had its judicial and educational system and implementation 
of the sharia law (Suwastoyo, 2001).  This law also granted Aceh to get 70 per cent of 
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its oil and gas revenue for eight years, after eight years this amount would be reviewed 
(Ibid.).  She always stressed that, she was strong supporter Indonesia integrity.  The 
military attack in the village and attacks of GAM insurgents to security forces in the 
region still continued and caused instability in the region (AFP, 2001a). There were 
attitudes and behavior of the adversary groups towards each other the cause increase 
of conflict escalation and continuation or deepening of the mistrust. The conflict 
escalation codes are much more than conciliatory gestures. As Mitchell mentioned that 
the implementation of the conciliatory gestures at the time of the war is less effective 
than at the time of the negotiation or cease-fire times (Mitchell, 2000).  As we can see 
from Figure 3.7, although the area occupied by the conciliatory gesture is more than 
occupied by conflict escalation; the frequency of conflict escalation lessens the 
probability of the success. Conciliatory gestures occupation is equal to 32% total place, 
conflict escalation and independence-autonomy debate each occupy 26% of the total 
place, and dialogue and peace process occupy 16% of the total place. Also in 2001, 
the independence-autonomy emerges as independence demand of GAM which could 
be interpreted as conflict escalation move.  Hence, to take into consideration this with 
other conflict escalation moves, conciliatory gestures could not be effective. GAM and 
state leaders because of this created structure by conflict escalation moves, as outcome 
of decision-makers, became less optimistic about future of the conflict and less willing 
to start dialogue with each other.  
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Figure 3.7. Aceh Conflict 2001; Conciliatory Gesture (6) 32%, Conflict Escalation 
(5) 26%, Dialogue- Peace Process (3) 16%, and Independence- Autonomy Debate (5) 
26% 
 
President Megawati on statement to the news declared she is ready to meet “anyone” 
during her visit to Aceh. During her visit she aimed to clear the picture about situation 
in the region, and to make face-to-face meetings with the Acehnese people, and to 
deliver policies about Jakarta proposal about autonomy law for Aceh (Japan Economic 
Newswire, 2001). On her visit to the province she apologized for the mistakes in the 
past. She declared: 
On course, I knew that the Central government had committed mistakes in the past. 
For that, on behalf of individuals and the government, as the President of Republic of 
Indonesia ... I offer a sincere apology to the society and the people of Aceh… Let's 
look for a (better) future (Harisumarto, Indonesia's Megawati visits Aceh, 2001).  
She apologized for the mistakes in the past and offered Acehnese to continue future 
with hope. This symbolic gesture followed after her Aceh visit and on this gesture she 
offered to forget mistakes in the past and apologized for the mistakes in the past. This 
symbolic gestures did not include any concessions by the state and it is just aimed to 
decrease mistrust between adversary groups. For the assurance of the not any physical 
attack to other party by the adversary group there should be minimum trust among the 
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parties (Zand, 1972).  It is important how these gestures were interpreted by the other 
party (Mitchell, 2000). These gestures of the state leader reacted as not important steps 
and there were not positive attitudes from GAM leadership. The visit of the President 
opposed by groups in Aceh. They claimed that this visit was not helping resolution of 
the conflict (Japan Economic Newswire, 2001). They claimed that this visit was 
Megawati’s publicity stunt, so that they rejected to meet with her (Deutsche Presse-
Agentur, ROUND UP: Indonesian president urges Aceh not to dwell on the past, 
2001). It can be also related with repeated visits of the Presidents to region, namely by 
Habibie, Wahid, and lastly by Megawati, diminished the impact of the visits on the 
people in the region. It can be inferred that the effect of the conciliatory gesture 
decreases with the repetition. The surprise effect and unexpected attitude as 
“shocking” effect decreases since people become familiar with that gesture and they 
started to guess clearly what next step will be. For example, there are two enemy 
parties and by the third party they come together and for the first time they shake 
hands. The impact of this conciliatory gesture by adversary group leaders are 
tremendous compare to repeated of the same gestures. Besides, at the same time the 
occurrence of the conflict escalation and conciliatory gesture resulted in the take into 
consideration more conflict escalation moves rather than conciliatory gestures. These 
moves also caused more mistrust among the groups. For example, at the time of the 
Megawati’s visit to the Aceh province, there were also violence incidents by the 
military (Harisumarto, Indonesia's Megawati visits Aceh, 2001). The violence was not 
only by the state side. The violence incidents emerged from the attacks of GAM to the 
government buildings and schools. This actions of GAM wanted to be stopped by 
Megawati during her Aceh visit (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, ROUND UP: Indonesian 
president urges Aceh not to dwell on the past, 2001). She aimed to decrease mistrust 
between the parties and urged that this action of decreasing mistrust is mutual. The 
decrease of the mistrust is mutual and through mutual steps to decrease mistrust there 
should be problem-solving (Barber, 1983). For brave action of the leaders to decrease 
mistrust leaders should be strong enough to stand against oppositions. Because, this 
steps to that aimed to make “change” on the structure of the conflict and groups who 
benefit from this or used to the conflict or for some other reasons they could stand 
against gestures offered by their leaders. For example Megawati’s predecessor, former 
President of the Indonesia Wahid, opted out from allowing referendum in the Aceh 
region after pressure from the military (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, ROUND UP: 
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Indonesian president urges Aceh not to dwell on the past, 2001).  Another symbolic 
gestures were seen by the release of the one of the student organization leader in Aceh. 
But at the same time of the release government declared to extend security operations 
for four months (Tjandraningsih, Aceh independence activist released from prison, 
2001).  
 
 
Figure 3.8. Expectation of Trust by the Parties 2001 
 
The released activist declared the demand for referendum for the Acehnese whether 
they want independence or autonomy. The insistence on referendum by the Acehnese 
leaders caused unwillingness of the state to make more conciliatory gestures. Since 
there was no concession from GAM leaders with regard to independence demands the 
state did not take concrete steps for take forward pre-negotiations to the dialogue phase 
(Tjandraningsih, 2001).  Moreover, the continuation of the violence by both sides also 
another determinant factor for unwillingness of parties to reassure to peace dialogue 
(AFP, 2001). 
 
In 2001, as we can see that trust and how parties frame the interest and approach of 
the adversary towards each other are important psychological factors. When we look 
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at the expectation of trust relation of state leadership towards GAM leadership, they 
demand stop of the attacks on the state buildings and retreat of GAM for independence 
movement (Suwastoyo, 2001; AFP, 2001). The trust of the state leaders to GAM 
leaders is at C3 quadrant with shown red “X2” (Figure 3.8).  
 
As shown before by Figure 3.7, there are conciliatory gestures and conflict escalation 
moves occupies similar space on the table. There were starting of some symbolic and 
tension reducing measure by parties towards each other. But these gestures did not 
help to create atmosphere for adversaries to start dialogue. Parties generally abstain to 
start negotiation with each other and the decrease of the mistrust occurs in slow 
motion. In 2001, the trust of GAM towards state is shown with X1 in quadrant C3. The 
unpredictability behavior of the state by the government is higher than predictability 
of GAM behaviors by state since there were strong military operations by the military 
and actions of the military cracked some hopes of dialogues between parties.  
 
3.1.1.2.2. Year 2002 
In 2002, GAM also started some conciliatory gestures as declared that they want peace 
talks with central government (AFP, 2002a). The condition of GAM leadership for 
state was that they want dialogue only with state level. GAM wanted adversary state 
leaders to accept them equal counterpart (Ibid.). Formerly there was some trials of 
talks with exiled GAM leader Hasan di Tiro, but ceasefires were always broken. In 
response to GAM’s demand for talks at state level, state rejected since GAM is not a 
state. This harsh stance towards each other and non-conciliatory attitudes prevented 
development of the talks for negotiations. Generally, continuation of the violence 
parallel to going on talks and meetings caused cease of the peace process (AFP, 
2002b). For example, there was arrest of some negotiators attending peace talks at 
capital. On the other hand, within GAM rebels’ attacks aid workers and other 
Indonesian staffs in Aceh province. These mutually taken steps by the Indonesian 
government and GAM rebels during peace talks caused rise of mistrust (AFP, 2002b). 
In 2-3 February 2002, President Megawati made efforts resume talks amid continued 
violence (Xinhua General News Service, Chronology of important events in 
Indonesia's Aceh, 2005). Despite efforts of peace talks by the President, there was 
decision of the extended military operations to the Aceh region which was seen as a 
“declaration of the war” by GAM (AFP, 2002c).  
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For continuation of peace process, there should be determined strong leadership to lead 
talks with adversary group despite of all other opposition repression. If there could not 
be powerful enough state leader, the continuation of the peace process is not 
guaranteed since the process could be demolished by strong oppression from the 
opposition groups in the state or within intra group structures (Mitchell, 2000). In the 
Aceh case there is property of weak leadership factor on the failure of peace process. 
There was claim by GAM that the government was weak and it always surrenders the 
decision of the military (AFP, 2002c; Daorueng, 2002).  After continued violence by 
the military and GAM (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Indonesia deploys 1,800 trained 
troops to Aceh, 2002), parties agreed to meet in Geneva for further talks about special 
autonomy for Aceh (Xinhua General News Service, Chronology of important events 
in Indonesia's Aceh, 2005). The restarted peace process between adversaries, which 
first started in 2000, failed to eliminate misgivings among the society (Daorueng, 
2002). The optimism of the Acehnese for success of the peace process remained weak. 
This weak optimism and mistrust of the Acehnese society towards both GAM and 
stated leaders caused from their behaviors. During the ceasefire and negotiations 
between parties, the military and GAM rebels applied violent means against each other 
(Daorueng, 2002; Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2002d). From the figure also we can infer 
that though there were strong efforts on dialogue and peace process (38%), the moves 
causing conflict escalation (27%) was dominant factor when compare with 
conciliatory gestures (22%) (Figure 3.9).  As mentioned before, if there is conflict 
escalation moves existence at the same time conciliatory gestures used, the gestures 
used for mitigating behaviors of adversary parties becomes ineffective (Mitchell, 
2000).  
 
The confusing statements from government authorities triggered the growth of 
mistrust between GAM and GoI. When comes to mid-2002, Indonesia’s Army Chief 
of Staff, General Ryamizard Ryacudu, said “there is no longer a need to engage in 
talks with GAM” (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2002b). This harsh stance towards peace 
process with GAM, raised concerns among people that military would engage another 
human rights violations in the province (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2002b; Deutsche 
Presse-Agentur, 2002d).   
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Figure 3.9. Dialogue and Peace process (17) 38%, conflict escalation (12) 27 %, and 
conciliatory gesture (10) occupies 22%.  
 
Also there was disappointment from the Acehnese towards GoI with regards to 
unfulfilled promises to end Aceh conflict (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2002b).  Instead 
of decreasing numbers of the troops in the region for open the way for reconciliation, 
security minister Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), who later became President 
after Megawati, proposed deployment of more troops to the Aceh province (Deutsche 
Presse-Agentur, 2002c).  Also the pressure of the military on the government for 
imposition of the martial law to the region increased the worries of people in the region 
and hope of peace in the region again faced crisis (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2002d). 
This was another initiator factor for spread of mistrust of each party towards each 
other.  On 19 August 2002, government declared a three months of ceasefire and 
accepted to give special autonomy to the region (Xinhua General News Service, 
Chronology of important events in Indonesia's Aceh, 2005). After first visit to the Aceh 
province in 8 September in 2001, President Megawati made her second visit to the 
province in September 2002 (AFP, 2002d). Her visit aims to conciliate tensions 
between parties and to create place for adversary parties to trust each other so that they 
could resume peace talks. We can see developments in this way by October 2002 and 
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parties agreed to resume dialogue by November 2002.  In October 2002, both parties 
agreed to resume peace talks in Geneva (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2002e). The peace 
talks were mediated by Henry Dunant Center (HDC) which later rebranded as Center 
of Humanitarian Dialogue (Klimesova, 2016; Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2002e).  At 
the end of the 2002, there was starting development of the hope for peace. The reason 
is the concession of GAM from the insistence on the independence. The Aceh governor 
Abdullah Puteh made a statement to the newspaper: 
GAM has accepted special autonomy as a starting point to end the prolonged conflict 
that has claimed thousands of people but its acceptance will be further discussed in 
detail (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2002e). 
GAM confirmed claim of Aceh governor since “[they] accept special autonomy only 
as the beginning of a commentary, because it was drawn up unilaterally by the 
Indonesian government” (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2002e).  As we can see that 
though there were some attacks of the parties towards each other, (AFP, 2002e; 2002f) 
at the same time this kind of tension reducing measures (TRMs) helped to close 
adversary parties. The GoI laid down GAM’s acceptance of state unitary state as a 
condition for resume of talks. Also on August 19, Yudhoyono declared government’s 
last offer to continue dialogue “within the framework of special autonomy and 
cessation of the hostilities.” If offer would be rejected by GAM, state aimed to 
intensify its operations to the region (Aspinall & Crouch, 2003). On November 1 in 
2002, GAM declared unilateral ceasefire and aimed to continue until December 10 
(AFP, 2002g).  On 9 December 2002, the GoI and GAM signed Cessation of Hostilities 
Agreement (COHA) brokered by HDC (AFP, 2002h; Aspinall & Crouch, 2003).  
Under the COHA, the Indonesian Military must abort offensive maneuvers and move 
into defensive positions and GAM members put their weapons into storage. The Joint 
Security Committee (JSC) is formed to monitor peace process, comprising 
representatives from both parties and an independent team consisting of officers from 
Thailand and the Philippines (Xinhua General News Service, Chronology of important 
events in Indonesia's Aceh, 2005; AFP, 2002h; COHA, 2003).  Indonesian negotiator 
Wiryono explained his thoughts about agreement: “With the signing of this cessation 
of hostilities agreement between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh 
Movement, a victory has been achieved” (AFP, 2002i). This agreement created 
opportunity for stage of confidence building process. This agreement reduced the 
tension between parties and the next stage for dialogue for peace could be reached 
63 
 
easily by the substantial contribution of confidence building (CBMs) and tension 
reducing measures (TRMs) as Mitchell pointed out (Mitchell, 2000; Aspinall & 
Crouch, 2003). After the agreement Megawati declared that the cessation of the 
hostility agreement will be supported by social rehabilitation, economic 
reconstruction, carry out democratic processes, and reconciliation (AFP, 2002i). 
Besides, the agreement is based on the confidence building process by both parties and 
they should abstain to restart violent means to destroy trust (Tjandraningsih, 2002; 
Xinhua General News, 2002).  
 
When comes to end of 2002, especially after this agreement there was increase of the 
trust between the parties. This agreement guaranteed involvement of the third parties 
to monitor any violence of the agreement. As mentioned before with this agreement 
parties accepted reactivation of the Joint Security Committee (JSC), which first 
established in Humanitarian Pause in 2000. The JSC was planned to consist of 
representative of parties and plus third party (HDC) (Aspinall & Crouch, 2003; 
Klimesova, 2016).  As a major concession from the government, it was accepted the 
presence of the international monitors. Moreover, GAM withdrew from their 
independence aim, since they accepted NAD law about special autonomy to Aceh as 
a “starting point” (Aspinall & Crouch, 2003). Besides according to agreement both 
parties agreed to withdraw their troops two months after agreement which due date 
was 9 February 2003, and according to agreement demilitarization would be completed 
on July 9, 2003 (Aspinall & Crouch, 2003; AFP, 2002h).  
 
Figure 3.10. Expectation of the Trust by the Parties 2002 
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Related to the agreement the trust between parties increased, but as we can see that 
there were cautious statements by the President Megawati and mediator Martin 
Griffiths on continuation of the agreement. From these cautious agreements we can 
infer that, though there was increased benevolence approach towards each other by 
parties, still we can see there was existence of the unpredictability of each other’s 
behaviors and attitudes. The trust of GAM towards the state is less than state’s trust 
with regard to predicting GAM’s behavior in accordance with agreement (Figure 
3.10). It is because there is problem of weak leadership who cannot resist oppression 
of the military. This factor of the effective military on Megawati’s decisions from the 
past experiences caused GAM to not predict what would be actions of the government 
afterward of the agreement signed.  
 
At the first months afterwards of the peace deal between GAM and GoI, clashes 
between them declined sharply.  "For the first time in two years, Aceh has seen a week 
pass without an armed clash between Indonesian government forces and the Free Aceh 
Movement (GAM) and only one small clash in the last two weeks," said the mediator 
from the Henry Dunant Centre (HDC) in a statement to the newspaper (AFP, 2003a).  
Thanks to the confidence building and tension reducing deal, the number of the killing 
of the civilians decreased from 87 every month of the 2002 to 12 death toll after first 
month of the agreement (Ibid.).  The result was tremendous and the deal created big 
hope for the future of the region.  
 
3.1.1.2.3. Year 2003 
The first break of the deal came on 14 January when GAM rebels attacked an 
Indonesian soldier in the area of East Aceh (AFP, 2003b).  But on March 3, the Joint 
Security Committee in Takengon, central Aceh, was attacked on March 3, 2003 (AFP, 
2003c). The Indonesian military was suspected of sabotaging peace deals by attacking 
peace monitors (Meitzner, 2006). After the attack the JSC left Aceh and people feared 
reappearance of the violations in the region started fled Aceh (AFP, 2003c). Although 
the deal signed on December 9, 2002 was still in the force, the fear again became 
dominant in the region and hope of the people suddenly disappeared since JSC fled 
and they were all alone again. After this incident there were emergence of the conflict 
escalator moves by the parties especially from the military. Growing cases of the 
violence in the region concerned the HDC for the 9 December deal (Deutsche Presse-
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Agentur, 2003a) and last week of the March, Indonesia army’s top brass meeting in 
Aceh was criticized as provocation (AFP, 2003d).  Normally, according to the deal 
there should be demilitarization of the region from the military and GAM fighters, but 
no sides took actions forward for putting in action the agreement (AFP, 2003c). The 
deadlock of the agreement started especially with GAM’s refusal to accept the idea of 
renouncing for independence struggle (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2003a). As 
mentioned before concession from one party to another helps the acceleration of the 
conflict resolution. But GAM resisted to give concession of the renounce from the 
independence, which was condition of the state for start of the peace deal. Although 
these developments was in the place on 7 April 2003, government send a symbolic 
gesture to GAM that they wanted to continue peace process in Aceh despite strong 
military opposition who claims peace is in jeopardy (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 
2003b). But there was signals of the mistrust of President Megawati towards GAM. 
She called military and police to be on full alert (Ibid.,). On the other hand, peace 
monitors who worked through Joint Security Committee (JSC) in the Aceh continued 
to withdraw and this unfortunately resulted in more fragile situation in the region. The 
withdrawn was as a result of the attacks on the JSC offices in the region. The 
unwillingness of the parties to demilitarize the region can be seen through the attacks 
on the JSC offices who monitor peace process (Japan Economic Newswire, 2003a).  
On 28 April 2003, government gave two week ultimatum to GAM to accept special 
autonomy condition and threatened that if rejected there would be military operation 
to the region (Deutsche Press-Agentur, International peace monitors leave Aceh as war 
looms, 2003c). But accept of the special autonomy condition was rejected (Xinhua 
General News Service, Chronology of important events in Indonesia's Aceh, 2005; 
Japan Economic Newswire, 2003b).  Besides the label of GAM towards the GoI started 
to become “colonial war” towards Aceh (Japan Economic Newswire, 2003b). This 
negative metaphor caused mistrust between adversary parties. There were also arrests 
of GAM negotiators by the state authorities and these all development with increased 
violence are conflict escalation moves by the adversary parties (Japan Economic 
Newswire, 2003b). As you can see from the Figure 3.11, the conflict escalation moves 
are more than conciliatory gestures. In an atmosphere of the conflict escalator steps 
there will be weak impacts of the conciliatory gestures on the conflict resolution 
process (Mitchell, 2000).  
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Figure 3.11. Frequencies of Conflict Escalators (28) with 44%, Dialogue-Peace 
Process (24) with 38%, Conciliatory Gestures (7) with 11%, and Independence-
Autonomy Debate (5) with 8% 
 
As from the figure we can see that the frequency of the conflict escalation moves 
occupies 44% of the frequencies; conciliatory gestures by the parties to de-escalate the 
conflict occupies only 11% of the frequencies. The methods used by adversary parties 
are prone to escalate conflicts and though there were important deal on 9 December in 
2002, afterwards the conflict escalator moves by the parties diminished the impacts of 
the deal and hope for developments with regard to emergence of the culture of the 
peace. Moreover, since the frequency of the conflict escalation moves are four times 
higher than the conciliatory gestures the debate about independence and autonomy 
(8%) is more related with harsh stance of the state towards independence and refuse 
of GAM to accept special autonomy. On the other hand, the dialogue-peace process 
code with 38% occupation is the second highest frequency in 2003. At this year the 
dialogue peace process is generally related with how the 9 December 2002 deal was 
failed and the reasons for failure of the peace process. There was not mention about 
co-occurrence of the hope and/or willingness with the peace process.  
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After the escalation of the violence some negotiators of GAM who were part of the 
peace process monitoring disappeared in May 2003 (Japan Economic Newswire, 
2003b). Both sides accuse each other about attacks on the negotiators but as analyst at 
that time mentions that GAM and GoI parties have different aims and expectations 
from each other. Two sides failed to reconcile basic differences over the government's 
desire to keep the country together and the rebels' aim of independence (Deutsche 
Presse-Agentur, 2003d).  Although there was breakdown of the December 9 agreement 
between the adversaries, the Stockholm-based leaders-in-exile of GAM agreed to meet 
with Indonesian government in Tokyo (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2003d; 
Harisumarto, 2003a). When parties started to meet at Tokyo, there was threat of 
starting military operations to Aceh province and also there were arrest of the five 
members of GAM members who were chosen to be negotiators at Tokyo (Deutsche 
Presse-Agentur, 2003e). These attitudes harden impact of the positive atmosphere for 
the peace process and it causes negative thought for adversary parties before the 
meeting started. Also during the meeting using threat as a stick could cause opportunity 
of the trust between adversaries. It is also important to note that both parties could not 
find a common ground for reconciliation. GAM before the Tokyo meeting insisted on 
the independence and the GoI threatened GAM to give up from this demand. Since 
there was no overlap of the aim, the meeting started from the unwillingness of the 
parties and with no hope for the resolution. Also the harsh stance of the military and 
preparing for the operation to the region during the meeting caused lack of trust 
between the parties (AFP, 2003e).  Zero-sum approach of the parties resulted in start 
of the martial law and military operations in the region (Harisumarto, 2003b). Violence 
has intensified in the past two months, with each side accusing the other of violating 
the agreement. The government accuses the rebel forces of using the ceasefire to 
promote independence, while the rebels charged the military has attacked supporters 
of the pact. Also, from the Tokyo meeting we can infer that international pressure is 
not enough for the end of the conflict (Harisumarto, 2003b). Moreover, there should 
be willingness of the parties for reconciliation and common ground for the peace. 
Besides after the peace agreement parties should agree what kind of procedure the will 
follow to implement agreed articles. Martial law was declared on 19 May 2003 and at 
the same time military operation started to the region. Because of the operations peace 
monitor left Aceh. Fear took place of the hope and again people witnessed spread of 
violence in the region (AFP, 2003f; Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2003g; Nunan, 2003).  
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After the martial law the number of the death increased because of the fact that GAM 
rejected to lay down their weapons, to give up their bid for independence, and agree 
special autonomy proposal of the GoI (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2003h). After the 
GoI banned entrance of NGOs to the region since May 19, there were rise of the 
violence and casualties in the region (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2003i; AFP, 2003g; 
AFP, 2003h; Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2003j). Apart from military operations there 
were also arrest of the some Acehnese GAM members (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 
2003k; Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2003m). Some of the negotiators sentenced to the 
jail also (AFP, 2003i).  As a result of continued operations, within 100 days after 19 
May death toll raised to around 750 in Aceh province (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 
2003L).  
 
In the situation of the war-torn region people’s hope disappeared for the end of the 
conflict. Moreover the insistence of the adversary parties for their bid of independence 
for GAM party and special autonomy for the GoI caused conflict of the interests and 
they closed dialogue channels for peace process (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2003n).  
 
 
Figure 3.12. Expectation of the Trust by the Parties in 2003 
 
Figure 3.12 shows that the trust of GAM towards the GoI weaker than vice versa. After 
the failed Tokyo meeting and with declaration of martial law in Aceh and the restart 
of the military operations diminished the opportunity for GAM to hope that there could 
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be end of the conflict. Especially with decision of not yielding from the bid of the 
independence the relations worsened. GAM negotiators detained and some of them 
faced jail terms (United Press Internaitonal, 2003; Deutsche Press-Agentur, 2003o). 
Because of arrest and sentence of GAM negotiators and military operations the 
perception about state authorities that they are malevolent and GAM leaders wholly 
predicted that the GoI aims to continue military operations on the region. On the other 
hand, because of the harsh military operations and insistence of independence by 
GAM, the GoI also wholly predicted that they are unwilling to end conflict and their 
aim is to reach independence. Because of “malevolent” intention of GAM they will 
continue to the military operation to prevent this “malevolent” intention of 
independence. The reason for GAM’s prediction of malevolent intention of the GoI 
(X1) is higher than the GoI’s predict of GAM malevolent intention (X2) is that since 
there are asymmetrical power relations between GAM and GoI, GAM continued war 
with state as a mean of survival of their power. Since there is dependence on the state 
willingness to start dialogue, X1 is higher than X2. When the state send conciliatory 
gesture to GAM leaders, opportunities for the dialogue emerges with positive reply of 
GAM leaders to that branch of olive (AFP, 2003j).  
 
3.1.1.2.4. Year 2004 
In 2004, clashes between GAM rebels and GoI military forces continued intensely 
(Xinhua Genral News Service, 2004). On the other hand, we can hear alternative 
solution proposals for military operations in the region. President candidate Hamzah 
Haz who was VP of the Megawati said, “rebellion was sparked by a sense of injustice, 
with the province's oil and gas resources siphoned off by the central government ... 
with the broad autonomy granted to the province and the resulting greater revenues 
from natural resource, Aceh could now begin to prosper” (AFP, 2004a).  During 2004 
there were continued military operations and GAM attacks on security forces (Xinhua 
General News Service, 2004b; 2004c; 2004d). In 2004 there  was some symbolic 
gestures by the state president such as her visit in Aceh and investing important 
projects in the region aiming to ease tensions (AFP, 2004b; 2004c). On her visit, 
Megawati said that it was not necessary to extend martial law beyond May, 2004. She 
also said that six important project will be inaugurated in Aceh province (AFP, 2004c).  
Since the violence were common in the region conciliatory gestures did not get 
positive response from GAM leadership. Instead of continuing these gestures started 
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by the state leader’s visit, investments in the region, and allow of the foreign monitors 
to interview with detained separatists (AFP, 2004d); the GoI chose to continue military 
operations and arrest of GAM activists. Besides, it is not only the GoI showed its 
propensity to continue violence in the region; but also GAM continued to attack 
security forces and state buildings in the region. For example there was attack on the 
polling station in Aceh which was operated by GAM (AFP, 2004e). At the election-
day the attack of GAM at the polling stations showed that there is no change of the 
perception of the GAM. Rebels attacked to the polling stations in 1999 legislative 
election too (AFP, 1999i). For GAM, to vote at the polling station, it means there is 
acceptance of the legitimacy of the state authorities on the region. Since GAM bid for 
independence, they reject any activities of the state in the region and threaten people 
to not vote at legislative elections times. That is why there were attacks on the state 
buildings and polling stations by GAM. The GoI saw these attacks as a threat to its 
power and authority on the region. So that the GoI insisted on the attacks on the region 
to push GAM to renounce from their aim of the independence (AFP, 2002c; 
Klimesova, 2016). On 19 May 2004 martial law was lifted and civil emergency 
implemented in the Aceh (Xinhua General News Service, 2005). That conciliatory 
gesture of the state was implemented as a result of the promise that was given to the 
Acehnese when resident Megawati visited region (AFP, 2004c). So state authorities 
showed to the adversary GAM members that they keep what they promised and this 
signal later did not follow by the lay down of the arms by GAM members. Because of 
that instead of restarting talk and meetings there were continuation of the violence in 
the region (Channel NewsAsia, 2004; AFP, 2004g). On the other hand there would be 
first round of presidential election on 5 July and main promises of the candidates is 
related with solution of Aceh conflict  President Megawati’ security minister at that 
time candidate SBY (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono) promised to create “safer and more 
prosperous” condition in war-torn Aceh province (AFP, 2004f).  
 
Yet Megawati again visit to Aceh province on 19 August 2004 to talk with people and 
promise that conflict would end soon but that visit too did not save the Acehnese from 
violence (AFP, 2004h; 2004i; 2004j).   
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Figure 3.13. Frequencies of Conflict Escalators (16) with 80%, Independence-
Autonomy Debate (3) with 15%, and Conciliatory Gestures (1) with 5%  
 
As we can see from the Figure 3.13, frequency of the conflict escalator are 16 times 
while conciliatory gestures was 1 time. The percentage of these two frequencies are 
80% for conflict escalators and 5% for conciliatory gestures. As you can see under the 
condition of the conflict escalator moves the possibility of the peace cannot be 
successful. Besides different from the Figure 3.12 we can see that, there were also 
independence-autonomy debate. Since GAM did not renounce from their demand of 
the independence, the impact of this code, used with 3 times of frequency which equals 
the 15%, negatively affected the conflict resolution in the Aceh. As Mitchell mentions 
that for the possibility of the peace dialogues between the adversaries there should 
concessions from adversary groups and conciliatory gestures should be dominant on 
the conflict escalators (Mitchell, 2000; 2014). Unlikely, for both sides in 2004 there 
were more negative steps and signals instead of the positive signal.  
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Figure 3.14. Expectation of the Trust by the Parties in 2004 
 
In terms of the expectation and trust of GAM and GoI towards each other, the 
perceptions of the both parties towards each other was not good since the continued 
violence and closed dialogue channels. As shown on Figure 3.14, the perception of 
GAM, GoI is malevolent on their intentions but there is unpredictability for attitude of 
the state since civil emergency took the place of the martial law in Aceh. Also the visit 
of the Megawati to the region and implementation of some important projects helped 
the change of the perception of GAM towards GoI from totally predicting malevolent 
intention in 2003 to unpredictability of the attitude and behaviors. On the other hand, 
from the GoI point of the view there was also unpredictability of GAM attitude and 
behaviors since GAM insisted on the independence bid and continued to attacks 
security forces, state buildings, and polling stations at election times (AFP, 1999; 
2004g).  
 
3.1.1.2.5. Year 2005 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) Presidency and Peace 
On 20 October 2004, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) succeeded Megawati and he 
stayed at office until 20 October 2014. In first months his presidency of SBY, there 
were also continuation of the military operations against GAM. Although martial law 
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which was implemented in 2003 was turned into civil of emergency on 19 May 2004, 
there were still existence of the around 30,000 troops and military operations in the 
region (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Indonesian troops kill nine rebels in Aceh, 2004). 
SBY’s presidency was hope for the future of Aceh conflict resolution since during his 
security ministry in 2003 he instrumented December 2003 truce between GAM and 
GoI (AFP, Indonesian calls on rebels in ACEH to lay down weapons, 2004). When 
SBY was a presidential candidate during election times, he promised to end the Aceh 
conflict and after he succeeded to become President it stood as a challenge for him as 
his first work to do (Ibid.). He called GAM to lay down its weapons but it was rejected 
once again. On 18 November 2004 SBY extended civil emergency for six months and 
this action was harshly criticized since he promised to end the Aceh conflict and broke 
his promise to the Acehnese (Japan Economic Newswire, Indonesi's Yudhoyono 
extends civil emergency in Aceh, 2004).  
 
In 26 December 2006 Indian Ocean earthquake occurred off the coast of the Sumatra, 
Indonesia with 9.1 magnitude. This large earthquake resulted in tsunami and Aceh 
region Indonesia was the most devastated region struck by the tsunami (Deutsche 
Presse-Agentur, ROUNDUP: Indonesian officials say relief work still hampered in 
Aceh, 2005).  After the 2004 tsunami disaster, the Indonesian government with the 
help of the religious scholars tried to convince the GAM to join the GoI to rebuild 
Aceh with the state (Ibid.). But the offer of the GoI was rejected by the GAM again. 
The GAM claimed that they will reject any offer if there was no involvement of their 
leader Hasan di Tiro on their negotiation with state (Burrell, 2005). Although there 
was official reject of the GAM to meet with state leaders, informal contact between 
the Indonesian government and GAM members was going on in Aceh (Brummitt, 
2005).  Later talks between GAM and GoI continued in Finland (AFP, Finland 
dialogue marks latest chapter in tsunami-hit Aceh's bloody history, 2005) and on the 
other hand Vice President Jusuf Kalla started meetings with community leaders in 
Aceh for their consultations about rehabilitation and reconstruction plan for Aceh 
region (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Indonesia hands over Aceh's blueprint three months 
after disaster, 2005). GAM members rejected offer of the self-autonomy for Aceh 
province and they also demanded release of the jailed GAM negotiators (Lekic, Aceh 
rebels dismiss Jakarta autonomy offer, demand release of negotiators, 2005). After the 
2004 tsunami on December 26, Aceh was devastated totally and GAM unilaterally 
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declared truce (Lekic, Aceh rebels dismiss Jakarta autonomy offer, demand release of 
negotiators, 2005). Moreover, the disaster affected Aceh region became an opportunity 
for adversary parties to negotiate with each other. On May 2005, the GoI declared the 
end of the civil emergency in Aceh which replaced martial law that was declared in 
May 2003 under Megawati presidency (AFP, End of emergency welcomed in 
Indonesia's Aceh, 2005). But end of the emergency did not mean withdrawal of 
Indonesian troops from the Aceh region and government claimed that troops would 
stay “to restore peace and order” and help local governments “safeguard the peace 
process of rehabilitation and reconstruction of Aceh” (Lekic, Indonesia lifts 
emergency in Aceh; rebels demand full withdrawal, 2005). But GAM members 
insisted on withdrawal of the troops from the region (Ibid.). Meetings between GAM 
members and GoI representatives was going on in an optimistic atmosphere in Finland 
and in those meetings Jakarta government pointed that any informal peace talks could 
continue in the context of Aceh not seceding from Indonesia (AFP, Exiled Aceh 
separatist leaders bow to government demand not to seceede, 2005). Indonesian 
government always showed its stance against independence of the Aceh. 
 
Meetings continued successfully and SBY ordered the armed forces to halt its 
offensive action against GAM since “… there is a political decision to settle it 
peacefully and so that the armed forces, in line with the president's demand, restrain 
themselves” (AFP, Indonesian president orders troops to end offensive in Aceh, 2005). 
Confidence building measures (CBMs) continued and Indonesian government 
promised to speed up withdrawal troops from war-torn Aceh (AP Worldstream, 
Indonesia to speed up troop withdrawal in Aceh, lays out rebel amnesty plan, 2005). 
As we can see from the Figure 3.15, conciliatory gestures are more than conflict 
escalator moves in which conciliatory gestures occupied 34% of all are with 18 
frequencies and conflict escalator moves with 8 frequencies occupied only 15% of all 
area. It is important to mention that in 2005, dialogue peace process which occupied 
42% and independent-autonomy debates with 9% (5 frequencies) contributed in a 
positive way the meetings between the adversary GAM and GoI since GAM renounced 
from its bid for independence.  
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Figure 3.15. Aceh Conflict 2005; Dialogue-peace process (22) 42%, conciliatory 
gestures (18) 34%, and conflict escalator moves (8) 15% 
 
Thanks to positive attitudes and behavior of the president SBY towards the Acehnese 
and GAM’s keeping its unilateral truce contributed trust level between these parties 
(Figure 3.16). As we can see from the Figure 3.15, the GAM was benevolent 
expectation of future attitude and behavior of the GoI. Especially after the 2004 
tsunami disaster, GAM could easily predict that state was willing to solve Aceh 
conflict through meetings (X1). On the other hand, the GoI was also optimistic about 
future behavior and attitude of GAM since government knew that GAM lost its power 
because of tsunami disaster (X2).   
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Figure 3.16. Aceh conflict, Expectation of trust by parties 2005 
 
Thanks to the Indonesian government’s and GAM’s insistence on not using military 
means in 2005, and sending conciliatory gestured to GAM members by the state on 15 
August 2005 peace deal was signed (AP Worldstream, Main points of Aceh peace 
agreement, 2005). According to the signed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
Aceh became self-governed with the exception of “foreign affairs, external defense, 
national security, monetary and fiscal matters, justice, and freedom of religion” 
(Ibid.).  Local parties in Aceh allowed, economically Aceh got the right to keep 70 
percent of its oil revenue, number of the police were cut in the region, and lastly all 
GAM members who did not use weapons received amnesty (AFP, Indonesia frees 450 
Aceh rebels to celebrate nation's independence, 2005).  
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CHAPTER 4 
KURDISH CONFLICT  
 
In this chapter, in the Kurdish case around 215 news items from newspapers were 
analyzed. The dates elaborated in the statements reflect the decisions of the leaders on 
news is between 2005 and 2010. The reason to choose 2005 for a starting date is first 
by 2005 August, the Diyarbakir visit of Prime Minister Erdogan, the first time state-
level leader accepted the existence of the Kurdish problem. After this statement by 
Erdogan, the Turkish state started to use peaceful means to end decades of Kurdish 
conflict. At the end of the 2009 with the Habur incident and exacerbated violence 
between the protagonists, the Kurdish Initiative lost its popularity at the state 
leadership level and it paved the way for an increase in military operations. In this 
paper, how the state leader acts plays an important role in the Kurdish conflict with 
regard to analyzing statements of the leaders, its reflection on the newspapers and 
reactions of society to these steps. There are fragile points that caused a breakdown of 
the Kurdish initiative. Through interpreting newspaper documents, it is aimed to show 
how statements of leaders can change atmosphere of the dialogue and developments 
that cause leaders to change their attitudes towards adversary leader.  
 
4.1. Kurdish Conflict 2005-2009 
4.1.1. Year 2005 
Until Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AK Party) became the leading party 
in Turkey, the Kurdish problem was handled with regard to security problem through 
military operations against the PKK rebels. But with Erdogan, the approach of the state 
towards the Kurdish problem changed. Since there were signals of change of attitudes 
of the Turkish government towards the Kurdish problem, Kurdish leaders and 
intellectuals started some statements about the Kurdish problem. Positive 
developments about the Kurdish problem shifted in 2005. On 21 February 2005, 
Democratic People’s Party’s (DEHAP) 56 mayors held a joint conference and said that 
Turkey should find an answer to the Kurdish question (Hürriyet Daily News, 2005a).  
At the state level, there was also ease of approach towards use of the Kurdish language 
in the public places. Formerly, the Kurdish language song cassettes, movies, and books 
were totally forbidden. But in 2005 there were some positive steps for eliminating 
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these restrictions. For example, Mehmet Ağar, who is important political figure at that 
time, in April 2005 sung a Kurdish song “Rindamin” at a dinner party in Batman. In 
reply to the journalist for his use of the Kurdish language at public meeting he said 
“Whoever wishes may take me to court because I spoke Kurdish” (Hurriyet Daily 
News, Mehmet Agar: "I can sing in Kurdish if I want-let them take me to court", 
2005b). The Kurdish problem in 2005 became important topic of the newspapers and 
before his trip to the Norway Erdogan was asked for his idea about the Kurdish 
problem and in reply to that he said “There is no such thing as the Kurdish minority” 
(Hurriyet Daily News, 2005c).  By that he meant that Kurdish citizens are many faces 
that makes Turkey and he said he against to differentiate Kurds from majority of 
Turkey. Using “Kurdish minority,” he claims, cause spread of virus that separates 
people from each other (Hurriyet Daily News, 2005c; 2005d). He also stated that 
terrorist Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK/ Kongra-Gel) is different concept from the 
Kurds in Turkey. In Oslo he continued that Kurds are citizens of the Turkey but state 
will fight against terrorist organization (Hurriyet Daily News, 2005d). On the other 
side, the PKK’s aim is to establish independent Kurdish state which includes southeast 
Turkey, northern Iraq, and some parts of Syria and Iran which was totally rejected by 
the Turkish state (Hurriyet Daily News, 2005e). For reconciliation between the parties 
there should be common ground between parties and concessions from some demands 
to reach an agreement (Mitchell, 2000; Pruitt & Kim, 2004). Since Prime Minister 
Erdogan’s approach towards the Kurdish problem changed political institutions’ 
attitude, on the military level there were operations and also attacks of the PKK rebels 
especially on eastern and southeastern of Turkey (Hurriyet Daily News, 2005f; 2005g).  
Erdogan’s first statements with regard to the Kurdish problem was not direct 
acceptance of the Kurdish problem. Rather he rejected differentiating Kurdish 
minority from general Turkish society and instead he emphasized the difference of the 
Kurds from the PKK organization. By that he gave the signal that there would be some 
reform for the Kurds in southeastern Turkey, but on the other hand the military 
operations will continue. Before the Erdogan’s era there was emphasize on the security 
problem and no propensity to the existence of the Kurdish minority in Turkey. In 2005 
there was acceptance of the reality of the Kurds in Turkey, but the naming it with 
regard to the “Kurdish problem” did not have the place at first months of 2005. 
Besides, the use of the Kurdish language by some politicians such as Agar, created a 
place for others to use the Kurdish language at public meetings. But unlike Mehmet 
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Agar’s case, in July 2005 Kurdish DEHAP deputy leader was sentenced as a result of 
using “dear sisters” in Kurdish (Hurriyet Daily News, 2005h). This difference of the 
prosecution process on Agar, a Turkish politician, and a Kurdish origin deputy cause 
increase of the mistrust instead of creating trust between parties.  Blau describes trust 
as: 
Trust is build up and mistrust diminished by a series of gradually increasing 
‘investments’ in the relationship in which the partners can demonstrate their 
trustworthiness to each other (Blau, 1964).  
According to this definition we can see that trust is based on relationship between 
parties and they should act in accordance to guarantee other party that party can be 
trusted by another one (Mitchell, 2000). But with the sentencing of the Kurdish leader 
but not sentencing Turkish politician expressed the Kurdish groups the opposite. But 
these policies did not stress much more with similar results. Apart from that, positive 
developments occurred. The Turkish state encouraged citizens to return their homes 
and the Turkish government guaranteed to support families in need (Hurriyet Daily 
News, 2005i).  At the same time the PKK continued their attacks on the civilians and 
security with claim of response to ongoing military operations. There was attack of the 
Kurdistan Liberation Hawks (TAK), which is sub-organization of the PKK, bombing 
attack in Çeşme, on eastern part of Turkey which caused twenty two people wounded 
(Hurriyet Daily News, 2005j). Later there was kidnap of the Turkish Mayor of 
Yayladere in Bingol followed (Hurrıyet Daily News, Turkish Mayor kidnapped by 
Kurdish Rebels, 2005k). Mutual attacks of the military operations and attacks of the 
PKK members continued vehemently until Erdogan’s Diyarbakir trip.  
 
Before the Diyarbakir trip Erdogan held a meeting with leading Turkish intellectuals 
in a bid to overcome PKK “terrorism” (Hurriyet Daily News, 2005n). This meeting 
contributed to tension reducing and gave a signal to the Kurds that the state is willing 
end the Kurdish conflict. Besides, after the meeting from the statements of the 
intellectuals, they said they saw Erdogan willing to end conflict soon (Hurriyet Daily 
News, 2005n). After the meeting with this positive atmosphere created by Erdogan 
through meetings with intellectuals and allowance of the opening of Kurdish language 
schools (Hurriyet Daily News, 2005L), so that his Diyarbakir trip occurred with great 
expectations from the society. For the first time at the state leader level there was 
acceptance of the responsibility for the Kurdish conflict. During the Diyarbakir trip he 
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stated “mistakes in the past” had done by state and instead of stuck mistake in the past 
he recommended to learnt something from it and use it as a path to recovery (Hurriyet 
Daily News, 2005o). He also stated "facing past mistakes is pivotal in the road to the 
bright future ahead" and also Erdogan pledged that the government is "ready and 
willing for every kind of solution," claiming responsibility for any conflict in the 
country (Hurriyet Daily News, 2005n). Also during the Diyarbakir trip, he said the 
Kurdish problem is concerned not only a portion of a society but it also concern of the 
entire population (Hurriyet Daily News, 2005o). He also said that one of the important 
characteristics of the big nation is to face mistakes in the past and continue stronger to 
the future (Hurriyet Daily News, 2005o). Before the Diyarbakir trip there was not 
important expectations from Kurdish society with regard to resolution of longstanding 
conflict (Çakir, 2011a). After the 12 August 2005 Diyarbakir trip, the state’s approach 
to the Kurdish conflict changed and alternatives for the “security measures” emerged. 
The meeting and Diyarbakir trip as a symbolic gestures and tension reducing measure 
(TRMs) helped to change perceptions of adversaries towards each other.  
 
But there were also conflict escalator moves. Although there were conciliatory 
gestures from the Erdogan and his statement with regard to diminishing mistrust 
between parties and confidence building attitudes, the military at that time positioned 
itself to stand against steps taken by Erdogan and his government to the Kurdish 
conflict. The military generally interpreted the Kurdish conflict as security issue and 
through successful military operations to Kandil Mountain, where the PKK leaders 
were hiding, and thus the conflict can end. For the military the priority of the state 
should be to eliminate threat posed by the PKK (Birand, 2005). After meeting with 
Intellectuals, by pressure of the Kurdish deputies on the PKK, there was temporary 
cease-fire from the Kurdish rebellion group (Çakir, 2011a). Just two days after meeting 
with intellectuals, the Diyarbakir trip incident happened. This by itself shows that the 
Erdogan government by getting support of the leading figures of the society aimed to 
decease mistrust of the Kurds from the state and diminish mistrust among the society 
on the actions of the government. Also Erdogan’s statement of declaration of “white 
page” to Kurdish problem he meant there would be some differences from former 
state’s policies on the Kurdish conflict (Çakir, 2011a). Besides, before Erdogan’s 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) there was state of emergency in southeast and 
eastern part of the Turkey which was started in 19 July 1987 and prolonged 47 times 
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until 2002. The AK Party came to power after 3 November 2002 elections as a leading 
party with majority of votes and lifted state of emergency on 30 November 2002 (AK 
PARTİ, İleri Demokrasi Yolculuğu: AK parti iktidarında Türkiye'nin Değişim ve 
Gelişimi 2002-2012). Also on the AK Party’s party program there was information 
about how to deal with the Kurdish problem. In the party program it was said the 
importance of unitary state and there will no assimilation of the other ethnic groups, 
the Turkish language as a lingua franca and official language will stay but ethnic 
groups’ use of their mother tongue for cultural activities would be supported (AK 
PARTİ, AK Parti Parti Programı). When came to 2005, parallel to party program 
Erdogan claimed there are three red lines: Ethnic nationalism, religious nationalism, 
and thirdly regional nationalism (Hurriyet Daily News, 2005o). In terms of ethnic 
nationalism, he said that there are many ethnic groups in Turkey and we cannot 
differentiate one from other. For regional and religious nationalism he stressed that no 
matter what one believed and no matter where he/she comes from “we are at an equal 
distance from them all” (Hurriyet Daily News, 2005o). The Diyarbakir trip was 
important trip from rhetoric of the state. For the first time Erdogan used the “Kurdish 
problem” at the meeting with leading intellectuals on 10 August 2005( (Çakir, 2011a; 
Hurriyet Daily News, 2005o). When look at the PKK unfortunately there was no 
positive steps from the leader of the organization to reduce conflict. When there was 
gestures from the Erdogan government, there was increased of violence on the middle 
of the year in 2005 (Hurriyet Daily News, 2005p; 2005q).  Although there were not 
concrete steps from the PKK organization to encourage steps of the state and to get 
trust of the state, Erdogan continued “Kurdish problem” policies with his government. 
On the fourth anniversary of his party he addressed the party deputies. In that meeting 
he clarified that terrorism has no religion, race, or nation and continued to clarify that 
the Kurdish problem would be solved within the framework of the democratic state 
structure (Hurriyet Daily News, 2005r). One of the reason that Erdogan government 
continued to its reforms with regard to the Kurdish problem is because there was 
differentiation between PKK as a “terrorist” organization and Kurdish society and their 
economic problems and cultural rights demands (Çakir, 2011a; Hurriyet Daily News, 
2005q; 2005w). Erdogan government because of starting these reforms for end 
Kurdish conflict and for the first time at state level leader name it officially as the 
“Kurdish problem” caused many criticisms from opposition parties and groups 
(Hurriyet Daily News, 2005s). Although there was criticism for his use of the “Kurdish 
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problem” he did not step back and continued to guard his place and his assertiveness 
to continue (Hurriyet Daily News, 2005s; 205ad). 
 
At this time the pro-Kurdish politics of Democratic People’s Party (DEHAP) united 
under Democratic Society Movement (DTH) (Hurriyet Daily News, 2005t). The aim 
of the joining the DTH and unity of Kurdish politics under one party to strengthen the 
Kurdish movement (Hurriyet Daily News, 2005t). After this unity of Kurdish politics 
under the DTH, they called PKK rebels to lay down their arms unconditionally for 
indefinite cease-fire (Hurriyet Daily News, 2005u). Especially with the start of the 
reforms on the Kurdish problem there was statements about Abdullah Ocalan. Former 
MP from the closed Kurdish dominated DEP party Selim Sadak: “The Kurdish people 
have their sensitive points. One of these sensitive points is the honorable Abdullah 
Ocalan, who is now on Imrali Island” (Hurriyet Daily News, 2005v). Abdullah Ocalan 
is the leader of the PKK and he was captured in 1999 in Kenya. Imrali is a prison island 
in Sea of Marmara where former PKK head Ocalan held for life sentence by Turkish 
authorities (Hurriyet Daily News, 2005v).  
 
Harsh criticism was not only from the opposition parties by claiming that Erdogan 
aimed to divide country just because his use phrase of the “Kurdish problem”. Also 
from military there was stance to Erdogan government’s use of phrase of the Kurdish 
problem (Hurriyet Daily News, 2005y). From the military perception, terrorism is 
related with economic and socially based problem and staff were prone to reject its 
ethnic origins. The military was also expected to call for a combined war on terrorism 
with coordination of civilian policies with military ones after the National Security 
Council (MGK) (Hurriyet Daily News, 2005y). Since government reform was 
welcomed by the Kurds in Turkey, the situation of Ocalan in Imrali Island put forward 
by the PKK leaders to assure their influence on the society. There was planned rally in 
Bursa but was rejected by the government because of security concern in which Bursa 
residents are known for their nationalist sentiments so the possibility of the pro-
Kurdish rally in a Turkish majority city could trigger turmoil and could cause 
government to face difficulties to explain reforms with regard to the Kurds to majority 
of society (Hurriyet Daily News, 2005aa). Because of rejection of the rally in Bursa 
protestors in support of jailed leader of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) Abdullah 
Ocalan turned into violent in Istanbul (Hurriyet Daily News, 2005aa). Since 
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government reform with regard to the Kurdish problem was premature, there was some 
malpractice that put into a difficult position government. For example, on October 
2005, DEHAP member was sentenced for saying “good day” in Kurdish (Hurriyet 
Daily News, 2005ab). This kind of policies decrease the opportunity for the trust 
relations between parties. In the Kurdish conflict Kurdish leading figures aimed to 
stand strong against the government and resistant to demands of state leaders from 
them. That was why as I mentioned before a Kurdish member came together under 
DTH and later changed their name as Democratic Society Party (DTP) (Hurriyet Daily 
News, 2005ac). Although there was unity of pro-PKK politicians under the DTP, there 
were alternative structure and institutions emerged such as former public works 
minister Şerafettin Elçi’s aim to form new political party. He was against the PKK and 
claimed that the PKK is disaster for Kurdish society and for Turkey and his aim was 
to establish nonviolent democratic political process for the Kurdish conflict (Hurriyet 
Daily News, 2005ae).  
 
In 2005 there was strong willingness of the Erdogan government with regard to 
political and economic reforms and fundamental human rights such as there was 
allowance of Kurdish broadcasting channels (Hurriyet Daily News, 2005ag). Besides, 
although there was strong military opposition (Hurriyet Daily News, 2005af) and an 
unresponsive PKK to the step for resolution of the Kurdish problem.  From the Figure 
4.1 we can see that the frequency of the conciliatory gestures are more than conflict 
escalation moves. Conflict escalation moves with 20 times of frequency is equal to 
40% and on the other hand conciliatory gestures occurred with 30 times of frequency 
which equal to 60% of total frequencies. Although the frequency of the conciliatory 
gestures are more than conflict escalator moves there was not conflict resolution. At 
the end of the 2005 the Şemdinli incident showed the strong opposition of the military 
to the reform of the Erdogan government with regard to the Kurdish problem. After 
that the state did not addressed the Kurdish problem as strong as former time. Also the 
actions of the PKK caused the government to not take brave steps (Saymaz, 2005). 
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Figure 4.1. Kurdish Conflict 2005; Conciliatory Gestures (30) with 60% and Conflict 
Escalation (20) with 40% 
 
In 2005 was that there were not strong trust relations between the parties and Turkey 
insisted on make differences between the Kurdish problem and the PKK. Also, since 
there was lack of trust between the parties there were not concrete steps for starting 
dialogue between the adversary parties (Figure 4.2). On the table while the PKK’s 
perception on government was labelled as X1, government perception about the PKK 
was labelled as X2.  The PKK was malevolent about Turkish government since 
government rejected to negotiate with the PKK about the Kurdish conflict (X1). Also 
PKK leaders thought that the stance of the state towards the PKK would not change 
and there would be continuous military operations though some reform were taken 
politically. On the other hand, perception of the Turkish state and its negative metaphor 
about the PKK (X2) is less than the PKK’s perception of trust towards the state. It is 
because there was asymmetrical power relation between the PKK and the state. The 
PKK used guerilla warfare strategy, while state via military institutions use modern 
warfare arms against the PKK. Because of this asymmetric power relation the 
perception of trust towards the PKK is more benevolent than the PKK perception on 
state since there were one-side temporary ceasefire during winter time by the PKK 
(Hurriyet Daily News, 2005u). Besides, the PKK bid for independence but Turkish 
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government with its all institutions rejected this and highlights the unitary structure of 
the state. Since the Erdogan government rejected for starting talks and meeting with 
PKK leaders, PKK leaders saw the reform of the government as a threat to its influence 
an increased its attacks on the civilians and security forces. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Expectation of the Trust for the Parties in 2005 
 
4.1.2. Year 2006 
In 2006 attacks of the PKK continued and on February 24 the PKK attacked the ruling 
AK Party regional offices in southeastern Turkey with the justification of to continue 
their attacks “…if AK Party government continues to stick to dirty policies against 
Kurdish people” (AFP, Kurdsih group claims bomb attack on AKP offices, 2006). 
Although there was PKK attacks, Erdogan government continued its reforms and in 
March 2006, The Supreme Board of Radio and Television (RTÜK) approved Kurdish 
broadcasts (Hurriyet Daily News, RTÜK approves Kurdsih broadcasts, 2006). 
Moreover, limits on Kurdish movies and music were lifted by the state. According to 
the decision television stations could run movies and concerts (Hurriyet Daily News, 
Limits o Kurdish movies and music lifted, 2006). Besides, in 2006 we witness that 
Kurdish and Turkish intellectuals met over the Kurdish problem and called for a 
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peaceful resolution of the Kurdish conflict. From the meeting it was claimed that there 
was “… crisis of confidence between two sides” (Hurriyet Daily News, Turkish and 
Kurdsih Intellectuals meet over Kurdsih issue, 2006). Since there was continued 
violence, the meetings and reforms in 2006 was not so much effective to settle conflict 
between parties (Hurriyet Daily News, Kurdsih violence spills over to İstanbul, 3 
people dead, 2006).   
 
 
Figure 4.3. Kurdish conflict 2006; conciliatory gestures (13) 57% and conflict 
escalator moves (10) 47% 
 
As we can see from the Figure 4.3, conciliatory gestures with 13 times of frequency 
occupied 57% of all area while conflict escalator moves with 10 times of frequency 
occupied 43% of all area. From the figure we can infer that, because of its occurrence 
with conflict escalator moves, conciliatory gestures succeeded little impact on the 
perceptions of the parties towards each other. Since there was occurrence of the 
conflict escalator with similar amount of the conciliatory gestures, parties acted 
unwilling to take further steps on the Kurdish problem. This situation of similarity on 
the frequency of the conflict escalator moves and conciliatory gestures affected 
expectation of trust between parties as well.  
87 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Expectation of the Trust for the Parties in 2006 
 
As we can see from Figure 4.4, the PKK’s expectation of trust on government was 
labelled as X1, while the government’s expectation of the trust for the PKK was 
labelled as X2. In 2006, although there were important steps from the government, the 
PKK was unwilling to respond those steps taken by the government because the PKK 
was not accepted as representative of the Kurds. Because of the legitimacy problem, 
PKK leaders did not trust government and approached government policies cautiously. 
On the other hand, Prime Minister Erdogan’s AK Party government continued its 
reforms with regardless of support opposition party and clear steps from PKK leaders. 
The reason that state has more positive perception on the PKK’s behavior and attitude 
is Erdogan believed that, through reforms they could break lack of confidence and 
mistrust between parties could diminish within time. For that reason, the state was 
more optimistic about future behavior and attitude of the adversary party.  
 
4.1.3. Year 2007 
In 2007 and 2008 the Kurdish problem was not main agenda of Turkish politics. In 
these years from the newspapers we could not find as much statements of the leaders 
as in 2005.  On March 2007, the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK ) posted a statement 
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and threatened to attack touristic places in Turkey and on the statement the threat was 
justified because of continued “… denial and annihilation of the Kurds” (AFP, 
Kurdish group threatens to target tourist areas, 2007).  Because of the increased tension 
between the Turkish government and the PKK, some Kurdish politicians faced trials. 
For example, one of the pro-Kurdish DTP mayor of Cizre town in southeastern Turkey 
was remanded in custody pending trial for his speech of praising separatist Kurdish 
PKK during Nevruz on March 21, 2007 (AFP, Kurdish politician arrested for Nevruz 
speech, 2007). On July 2007 general election the AK Party received victory in 
southeastern cities of the Turkey (Hurrıyet Daily News, AKP victory in southeastern 
cities "ruins" Kurdish- backed DTP plans, 2007). The victory of the AK Party 
government in Kurdish populated cities showed that there was huge support of the 
Kurds to the Erdogan’s Kurdish initiative, which was started in 2005. After the election 
results, the Kurdish problem again became main agenda of the Erdogan government 
and its policies about Kurdish problem would be reach a peak in 2009. So that, the 
DTP demanded constitutional recognition of the Kurdish reality from the Turkish 
government (Hurriyet Daily News, DTP wants a constitution recognizing Kurdish 
reality, 2007). This demand later became one of the important topic related with the 
Kurdish problem. There were also alternative constitutions and political regimes 
systems by Kurdish deputies such as Spanish style constitutional structure in which 
there were 17 different autonomous zones protected by Spanish constitution. But 
proposal which were against unitary system of the government was rejected by the 
government (Hurriyet Daily News, ProKurdish party calls for Spanish-style 
constitution, 2007).   
 
As we can see from Figure 4.5 that the frequencies of the “conciliatory gestures” and 
“conflict escalator moves” are close to each other.  As mentioned before, in 2007 
similar to 2006 the Kurdish problem was not main agenda of Turkish policy. But 
especially after the general election in July 2007, Erdogan’s AK Party (Justice and 
Development Party) gained enormous results from southeast cities in Turkey, so that 
Erdogan noticed that there was public support to the reforms with regard to the Kurdish 
problem. Although conciliatory gestures increased especially after the 2007 elections, 
there was still military operations and PKK attacks which affected negatively conflict 
resolution efforts. In 2007, as we can see that there were total 16 news stories which 
were related with conciliatory gestures and conflict escalator moves. Out of total 16 
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frequencies there were 7 news stories which are regarded with conciliatory gestures of 
the leaders and 9 news stories which are conflict escalator from the statements of the 
adversary leaders. Conciliatory gestures occupy 44% while on the other hand conflict 
escalator moves occupied 56% of all news (Figure 4.5). 
  
 
Figure 4.5. Kurdish Conflict 2007; Conciliatory Gestures (7) with 44% and Conflict 
Escalation (9) with 56% 
 
Since frequencies of conciliatory gestures and conflict escalator moves are close to 
each other the impact of the conciliatory gestures on the attitude and behavior of the 
adversary parties diminished by the conflict escalator moves (Mitchell, Gestures of 
Conciliaton: Factors Contributing to Successful Olive Branches, 2000). The Figure 4.6 
shows the Turkish government was more optimistic than 2006 (X2). The reason is that 
with election government realized the support of the public with huge support of the 
cities in Southeastern of the Turkey (Hurrıyet Daily News, AKP victory in 
southeastern cities "ruins" Kurdish- backed DTP plans, 2007). Still we can see that the 
Erdogan government was optimistic about future behavior and attitude of PKK leaders 
but still there was unpredictability what would be their next step. That was why in 
2007 the government followed stable policies with regard to the Kurdish problem. 
Compare to 2006, the PKK’s expectation of trust (X1) for the Erdogan government 
got better position and pessimistic view on the future attitude and behavior of Erdogan 
took place with unpredictability (Figure 4.6). This change of the perception helped the 
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Kurdish deputies to propose different views about the Kurdish problem such as 
alternative constitution views on the parliament.  
 
 
Figure 4.6. Expectation of the Trust for the Parties in 2007 
 
4.1.4. Year 2008 
In 2008 similar to 2007, the Kurdish problem was not main agenda of Turkish politics 
again. But as mentioned earlier, with July general elections the Kurdish problem 
gained momentum in Erdogan’s government. Similar to take DTP deputies also took 
steps forward took contribute on the Kurdish initiative started by the Erdogan 
government. For example, on first days of the 2008, there was a PKK attack in 
Diyarbakir which resulted in 5 killed and injured many people. The Pro-Kurdish 
Democratic Society Party (DTP) deputies condemned that attack but abstained from 
condemning the PKK directly (Hurriyet Daily News, Kurdishbacked DTP MPs 
condemn Diyarbakir attack, 2008). DTP officials continued and claimed that cross-
border military operations to the PKK camps in the Kandil Mountains, Iraq was the 
main cause of the Diyarbakir’s attack and other PKK attacks (Hurriyet Daily News, 
PKK slams proKurdish party's stance on PKK, 2008). The criticisms of the DTP on 
military operations continued another months in 2008 (Hurriyet Daily News, Kurdish 
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politicians criticize operation, 2008). Besides, PKK also slammed pro-Kurdish party 
members for their stance on PKK. This shows that PKK did not want DTP to be 
criticism of the actions of PKK operations within Turkey (Ibid.).  
 
In 2008 there were also demands to the DTP from the Turkish government to allow 
the Kurdish language in official documents. This demand strained relations between 
the Kurdish side and the Turkish government, which was reflected as conflict escalator 
move in our quantitative data analysis. The government continued its investment 
programs and social initiatives in the Kurdish region (Hurriyet Daily News, 
Government initiative good but not enough, says pro-Kurdish party, 2008) and during 
2008 we witnessed the realization of the programs that were promised in former years 
such as prepare for substructure of the Kurdish language broadcasting by TRT 
(Turkish Radio and Television Association) (Hurriyet Daily News, Balancing atop 
Kurdish trapeze, 2008). Also during that time DTP leader Ahmet Turk called the PKK 
to “disregard arms as a means to obtain rights” and he continued on to the 
implementation of the constitution based on autonomy for Kurds in the region (Ibid.). 
But in 2008, the attacks of PKK members and military operations continued and this 
situation strained the dialogue and atmosphere (Reuters, 2008).  
 
In 2008 as we can see that conciliatory gestures and conflict escalator moves 
frequencies are close to each other (Figure 4.7). From the figure we can see that 
conciliatory gestures occupied 53% and on the other hand conflict escalator moves 
occupied 47% of all frequencies with regard to the Kurdish conflict. Similar to 2006 
and 2007, in 2008 there were no important steps taken with regard to the Kurdish 
problem and during 2008 since conflict escalator moves are close to conciliatory 
gestures, the impact of the conciliatory gestures could not become effective as in 
former years. Besides, because of the conflict escalator moves, which were generally 
motivated by military operations and PKK attacks, there was not total predictability of 
the optimism of the one another on their future attitude and behaviors.  
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Figure 4.7. Kurdish conflict 2008; Conciliatory gestures (12) 53% and conflict 
escalator moves (9) with 47%  
 
From the Figure 4.8 we can see that in comparison to 2007, the PKK’s predictability 
on the attitudes and behavior of government turned more in a negative way because of 
the action of closing was taken against the pro-Kurdish DTP at the end of 2007 (CNN 
Türk, DTP hakkında kapatma davası açıldı, 2007). Although it was still malevolent 
and unpredictable on the future attitude and behavior of the government, when 
compared with former year the intensity of the negative metaphor on the adversary 
state increased because of action of closing against the DTP. On the other hand, for 
the Turkish state, there was still optimism in terms of resolution of the conflict (Figure 
4.8). In 2008, effects of the results of the elections on the Erdogan government 
continued and with some conciliatory gestures government continued to use peaceful 
means to end the Kurdish conflict.  
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Figure 4.8. Expectation of the Trust for the Parties in 2008 
 
4.1.5. Year 2009 Kurdish Initiative and Its Failure 
In 2009, until mid-2009 there were no important developments with regards to the 
Kurdish problem. In June 2009, the DTP held a conference and called for autonomy 
and freedom for the PKK leader Ocalan (Hurriyet Daily News, Kurdish conference 
calls for autonomy, freeing of PKK leader, 2009). At the conference, it was decided 
that freedom for Ocalan, autonomy, and the PKK’s inclusion to the efforts for peace 
are keys for peace establishment in the Kurdish conflict (Hurriyet Daily News, Kurdish 
conference calls for autonomy, freeing of PKK leader, 2009). Different from former 
years, Kurdish deputies ensured their demands from the Turkish state and these 
conditions were shown as “red lines” of the PKK. In the Kurdish conference at that 
time Hatip Dicle said, “The conference has shown what kind of Turkey and what kind 
of freedom Kurds want” (Hurriyet Daily News, Kurdish conference calls for 
autonomy, freeing of PKK leader, 2009). In terms of cultural rights, the Kurds allowed 
were to converse with their relatives and spouses in languages other than Turkish. This 
was important step for decreasing border between the Kurdish society and the Turkish 
state. This symbolic gesture contributed to demolish “evil state” in the minds of the 
Kurdish people if there was such case (Milliyet, Inmates allowed to converse in 
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Kurdish, 2009). In the past, conversation in other languages were forbidden even if 
they could not speak Turkish. Same development occurred on telecommunication 
systems. Earlier in 2009 state broadcaster Turkish Radio and Television Corporation, 
or TRT, began to broadcast in Kurdish and the news channel was TRT 6 (Later it 
became TRT Kurdi) (Milliyet, Inmates allowed to converse in Kurdish, 2009). Also 
through symbolic gestures state helped society to support reforms since by symbolic 
gestures not only Kurdish society started to believe in sincerity of the state, but also 
the Turkish society started to support it. Symbolic gestures by their nature are 
innovative and it represents something beyond themselves, so that this meaning given 
to the gestures helps them to become influential on the resolution of the conflict 
between adversaries (Mitchell, Gestures of Conciliaton: Factors Contributing to 
Successful Olive Branches, 2000). Contrary to these gestures there are some conflict 
escalator moves that happened as well. For example, in June 2009 there were two cases 
against DTP member Cemal Coşkun from Digor and İzmir. An investigation by the 
Digor prosecutor was dismissed on his speaking of Kurdish language at a gathering. 
On another gathering, again Coşkun was filed since he was speaking Kurdish language 
again. On that case Izmir prosecutor filed Coşkun for speaking any language other than 
Turkish (Milliyet, Conflicting judgments on Kurdish use, 2009). There could be claim 
that all Turkish citizens have to follow the rules implemented at that time. But as the 
example shows that there were conflicting judgements on the Kurdish problem and 
this kind of decision does not help to end long-standing conflict. Since Erdogan 
government declared the PKK as a terrorist organization he declined to starts direct 
talks with its leaders. This policy continued in 2009 and Erdogan refused to hold talks 
with the pro-Kurdish party, DTP, officially since no any denouncement for the PKK 
as a terrorist organization from the party (Hurriyet Daily News, ProKurdish party 
expects Gul to give appointment, 2009).  DTP members demanded appointment from 
the Turkish President of that time, Abdullah Gul, as well, after his statement of 
“historic opportunity” about resolution of the Kurdish problem (Hurriyet Daily News, 
ProKurdish party expects Gul to give appointment, 2009). At the meeting DTP 
members aimed to show their report which includes, “recognition of Kurdish identity 
and language in the Constitution, the discussion of a federal state system and 
implementation of the Basque model” (Hurriyet Daily News, DTP mayors to submit 
report to Gül on Kurdsih problem, 2009). Also they wanted Ocalan’s road map on the 
Kurdish problem to be taken into account, which was later announced on August 2009 
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(Ibid.). Ocalan’s road map was based on four steps and it was included an introduction 
about why Turkey should solve the Kurdish problem and suggested that Turkey started 
to have good relations with the Kurds in Mosul, Kirkuk, and Syria, which means Kurds 
remaining within the borders of Misak-I Milli (Hurriyet Daily News, Öcalan reveals 
'road map' for solving Kurdsih issue, 2009).  Misak-I Milli (National Oath) was 
Ottoman parliament’s final decision and in that decision new borders of the Turkey 
were decided. The current borders of Turkey are similar with the borders withdrawn 
in Misak-Mili except Mosul and Kirkuk, which belonged to Turkey according to 
Misak-I Milli (Ibid.). Through mentioning Misak-I Milli, Ocalan aimed to induce 
Turkey to have good relations with Kurds in Northern Syria based on democratic 
autonomy (Hurriyet Daily News, Öcalan reveals 'road map' for solving Kurdsih issue, 
2009). On the road map Ocalan also highlighted the need for “democratic 
constitution” and time to free from September 12-coup Constitution (Ibid.).  Ocalan’s 
road map was expected to announce on 15 August 2009, but since prevented by prison 
administration with the claim of “against the state’s interest,” it was announced to the 
public later in 2011 (Hurriyet, 2011).  Since there was claim of release of “road map” 
of Ocalan, the government announced its initiative for solving the Kurdish problem 
before August 15. The AK Party government increased its studies on the Kurdish 
problem and aimed to make redundant jailed PKK leader’s “road map” while 
proposing “radical” new initiatives (Radikal, 2009).  Clearly it can be seen that both 
adversary parties fear to lose their influence on the society so that they aimed to declare 
their own plans to attract attention of the society on their side. That was why Turkish 
government increased its study to make Ocalan’s “road map” redundant.  
 
In 2009, the Erdogan government continued its reforms with regard to the Kurdish 
problem. For example, Hakkari University in southeastern part of the Turkey was first 
university to launch a web site in Kurdish. Its aim was to inform Kurdish-speaking 
citizens about projects in the university (Hurriyet Daily News, Hakkari Universit 
launches Kurdish web site, 2009).  In one of the analysis from a newspaper it was 
claimed that decades of the conflict and suffering in southeast Turkey started to 
passing through a “hopeful” phase and residents in Diyarbakir pointed that peace 
would be guaranteed with economic development and job creation. Analysis also 
stressed that according to people on the streets of Diyarbakır the job issue was 
generally hijacked by PKK extremists (Hurriyet Daily News, Jobs key to solving 
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Kurdish problem, 2009). But it is also important to mention here that a person’s 
political stance also can be influenced by the economic environment he lives and 
influence of the state or the PKK that embraces him/her.  While there was this king of 
analysis with regard to society level, on top level structure the Pro-Kurdish Democratic 
Society’s Party (DTP) leader Ahmet Turk met with the Turkish Industrialists’ and 
Businessmen’s Association (TÜSİAD) delegations. Chairwoman of the TÜSİAD said 
that the association aims to contribute to the resolution of the Kurdish conflict through 
“meeting with president, the prime minister, and leaders of the political parties 
represented in Parliament” (Hurriyet Daily News, Business group to meet pro-
Kurdish DTP, 2009). This meeting also showed that even in 2009 important 
institutions, like the government, did not consider Ocalan as an interlocutor between 
the PKK and government (Ibid.).  Since there was some initiatives from the 
government and the Kurdish was still delicate subject for the Turkish society, Prime 
Minister Erdogan warned his deputies to not make statements that would harm the 
government’s “coherent” policy on Kurdish problem (Hurriyet Daily News, PM urges 
consistency in party statements on Kurdish problem, 2009). Erdogan’s statement came 
after the Diyarbakir deputy’s “Algerian model” proposal” for the Kurdish problem, 
which caused strong criticism from opposition parties and cautious approach from the 
Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) (Ibid.).  
 
All these developments contributed to a changing perception of the Pro-Kurdish party 
members on the Kurdish conflict. There was the emergence of a hope among Kurdish 
party members. For example, the Democratic Society, DTP, member Hasip Kaplan 
said, “We are at the closest point to a solution. I am very hopeful,” about the future of 
the conflict (Hurriyet Daily News, The final turn in government's Kurdsih opening, 
2009). Especially the news study of the reform with regards to the Kurdish problem 
encouraging for the resolution of the Kurdish conflict. Abolishment of the outlawed 
PKK, economic, political, and cultural reforms, amnesty to the members of the PKK, 
Kurdish-language education, renaming of the towns in Anatolia to their original names 
are some of the important topics concerning the Kurdish conflict (Ibid.). DTP deputies 
insisted on Ocalan and they demanded Ocalan to be accepted as an interlocutor for the 
dialogue period. In 2009, the position of Ocalan regarding the Kurdish problem 
emerged as an important issue.  
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Thanks to these positive developments, on the first day of the August 2009, pro- 
Kurdish DTP deputy Aysel Tuğluk said, “the language used by Kurdish politicians 
should have been more uniting” so she noted that her party was not uniting in terms of 
statement that contributes on the solution of the Kurdish problem (Milliyet, DTP also 
to blame in Kurdish problem, says deputy, 2009). But it was interesting that after her 
statement she inexplicitly threatened the government that if the process ended in 
disappointment, the clashes would be more violent (Ibid.). Threatening of the 
adversary of the parties towards each other cause lack of trust and increased the level 
of the mistrust between the adversary parties. She may be urging the state to end the 
process with resolution of the conflict, but her implication of the intense violence if 
there was a failure, caused mistrust between parties. So in these fragile times, the 
statements of the important figures are an important determinant factor on the path of 
the conflict resolution. During 2009 there were important statements from government 
politicians to ease the tension and increase the hope for the resolution of the conflict. 
That time Interior Minister Beşir Atalay said, "We believe the Kurdish problem can be 
solved by improving and enhancing the democratic rights of our citizens and ensuring 
that all see themselves as free and equal citizens;" so he implies that only with “more 
freedom and more democracy” (Hurriyet Daily News, Turkish gov't vows more 
democracy to solve Kurdish issue, 2009) the Kurdish problem could be solved 
(Hurriyet Daily News, Turkish gov't pledges more democracy to resolve Kurdish 
problem, 2009). Although there was strong slams on Erdogan government’s “Kurdish 
opening,” Erdogan continued reforms with determinacy (Hurriyet Daily News, MHP 
hits back at governmen's 'Kurdish opening', 2009; 2009a). Though Erdogan opposed 
to meet with Pro-Kurdish DTP deputies, since they did not distance themselves from 
the PKK. But his stance against DTP members changed and Prime Minister Erdogan 
met with party officials on August 2009 (Hurriyet Daily News, Turkish PM to meet 
proKurdish party officials, 2009) . He also reiterated that he did not see the PKK and 
the DTP as the same, the DTP was a political party which represented in the Parliament 
while on the other hand the PKK is a terrorist organization, he claimed. Because 
Erdogan claimed that instead of Ocalan to be seen as an interlocutor, he saw the DTP 
as an interlocutor (Hurriyet Daily News, Turkish PM to meet proKurdish party 
officials, 2009). Erdogan refused to meet the DTP since 2007 and in 2009 meeting was 
a signal that there could be some positive developments for resolution of the conflict 
(Ibid.). After this meeting with DTP deputies, Erdogan came together with his 
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ministers to discuss the developments on the Kurdish problem (Hurriyet Daily News, 
Erdoğan convenes minisummit on Kurdish question, 2009). All these developments 
together, meeting with DTP deputies, meeting with key ministers regarding the 
Kurdish problem contributed hope for future. But as Mitchell points out, conciliatory 
gestures: concessions, tension reducing measures, symbolic gestures, and confidence 
building measures, all these gestures need to be supported by the attitude and behavior 
of the adversary groups (Mitchell, Gestures of Conciliaton: Factors Contributing to 
Successful Olive Branches, 2000). The Erdogan government wanted to take support 
of opposition parties on his “initiative” for the Kurdish problem; but it was rejected by 
far-right nationalist party Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the Republican 
People’s Party (CHP) (Hurriyet Daily News, Political storm around Kurdish issue hit 
Turkey, 2009; Hurriyet Daily News, Turkish Opposition rejects meeting with gov't to 
discuss Kurdish plan, 2009). Also the clashes between Kurdish rebel groups and 
military forces did not contributed to the positive developments led by the Erdogan 
government (Hurriyet Daily News, Soldier, Kurdish rebel killed in clash in Turkey: 
report, 2009). As we can see that though there was changing stance of Erdogan 
regarding the DTP and meeting with deputies from pro-Kurdish DTP members 
eliminated one of the important conflict escalator move, because of existence of other 
conflict escalator moves in that time like military operations and lack of support of the 
opposition parties hardened the Erdogan to take brave steps. But still Erdogan was 
insistent on the continuation of the reforms regarding the Kurdish problem. As he said, 
“we will not retreat from this process no matter what it costs. We set out undertaking 
a risk and we will do what is necessary” (Hurriyet Daily News, No retreat from 
Kurdish move, says PM, 2009). Thanks to Erdogan government’s willingness to 
continue the Turks and Kurds started to support the Kurdish initiative (Hurriyet Daily 
News, Poll shows Kurdsih initiative in tune with most Turks and Kurds, 2009). While 
positive steps were taken by the government the criticisms of the opposition parties 
continued and there were also cross-border military operations on the Kandil mountain 
where top-level leaders of the PKK lived (Hurriyet Daily News, ProKurdish party 
opposes extending military's cross-border mandate, 2009).  There were also attacks of 
the PKK fighters to the security forces and clashes between the PKK and Turkish 
forces prevented spread of positive developments to the society with regard to the 
Kurdish problem (AFP, Military: Three Kurdish terrorists killed in Turkey, 2009).  
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One of the most important turning points in 2009 was the Habur incident. On 19 
October 2009, with the order of Ocalan, 34 PKK fighters entered to the Turkey from 
Habur border gate. On October 19, since there was celebratory welcome given to the 
PKK “peace group” at a rally in Diyarbakir, the government decided to pause ongoing 
Kurdish initiative (Hurriyet Daily News, Turkey pauses Kurdish move, delays PKK 
returns, 2009). After that incident Erdogan decided to “take a break” since there was 
“crisis of confidence”, and he accused the pro-Kurdish DTP of orchestrating unwanted 
developments (Ibid.).  On 11 December 2009, the Constitutional Court decided to ban 
the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) for links to the PKK (Hurriyet Daily 
News, Kurdish unrest erupts in Turkey after DTP ban, 2009). The closure of the DTP 
triggered demonstrations in the southeastern of the Turkey. It was reported that 
protesters chanted slogans that praised jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan and some 
of protesters attacked police and security cameras of the banks (Ibid.). After its closure, 
the Pro-Kurdish DTP party deputies decided to resign from Turkish parliament. But 
later, insistence of the Turkish officials and from society, instead of quit from 
parliament Kurdish deputies decided to join Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) 
(Hurriyet Daily News, Turkey's Kurdish deputies to join BDP in Parliament, 2009).  
  
Although there was important developments in 2009, with regard to the Kurdish 
language schools and allowance of Kurdish language classes at the universities as 
important conciliatory gestures from Turkish state, because of conflict escalator moves 
the Kurdish problem did not progress to peace (AP, 2009). After the Habur incident 
and closure of the pro-Kurdish DTP the 2009, the “Kurdish initiative” failed to end the 
Kurdish conflict. 
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Figure 4.9. Kurdish Conflict 2009; Conciliatory Gestures (72) with 70% and Conflict 
Escalation (31) with 30% 
 
Although the frequency of the conciliatory gestures are more than conflict escalator 
moves, the reason for failure of the “Kurdish initiative” in 2009 was the state did not 
get what it expected from the adversary group, the PKK (Figure 4.9). In 2009, Erdogan 
government took responsibility and re-started the Kurdish initiative, which was 
stopped in 2005, but on the other hand, the PKK did not take brave steps to respond 
gestures of the Erdogan government. Mitchell mentions that if there are more 
conciliatory gestures than conflict escalatory moves there are possibility of the success 
of the end of the conflict (Mitchell, Gestures of Conciliaton: Factors Contributing to 
Successful Olive Branches, 2000). Although conciliatory gestures were dominant in 
2009, since these conciliatory gestures were not mutual and only the Turkish 
government contributed to the resolution of the Kurdish conflict, the Kurdish conflict 
failed to reach peace (Figure 4.9). Besides, there were also military operations, PKK 
attacks, and it is important to mention, important incident diminished impacts of the 
conciliatory gestures: the Habur incident and the closure of the pro-Kurdish DTP. 
These two incident were turning points in 2009. Up until 2009, the perceptions of 
society and the government on the Kurdish initiative was positive. But first with the 
Habur incident, Turks reflected their reaction since there was a celebrating welcome 
to the PKK member by the Kurds in Diyarbakir. Because of that incident the trust of 
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the state to the diminished towards PKK as Erdogan said that there was “crisis of 
confidence” (Hurriyet Daily News, Turkey pauses Kurdish move, delays PKK returns, 
2009).   
 
 
 
Figure 4.10. Expectation of the Trust for the Parties in 2009 
 
In the Figure 4.10, the PKK’s perception on the attitude and behavior of the 
government was labelled with X1 and on the other hand, the government’s perception 
on the attitude and behavior of the PKK was labelled with X2. As mentioned above, 
the Erdogan government started its reforms to end the long-standing Kurdish conflict. 
With that regard there were many reforms put in place on cultural, economic, and 
political rights. Formerly there were not any formal meetings between the Erdogan 
government and the pro-Kurdish DTP party since Erdogan demanded from the DTP 
to distance itself from the PKK and condemn its attacks (Hurriyet Daily News, Pro-
Kurdish party expects Gul to give appointment, 2009).  Generally, in 2009 the PKK’s 
expectation of trust (X1) was less than the government’s expectation of the trust (X2). 
Since there was continuation of the military operations towards the PKK camps in the 
Kandil Mountain, the PKK did not trust sincerity of Erdogan government’s reforms 
and democratic initiatives. Also, at first the Erdogan government rejected to start 
meetings with the pro-Kurdish DTP party. This attitude also caused the problem of 
whom to take into account to start talks. For the PKK these moves were seen as 
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ignoring authority of the PKK and the pro-Kurdish DTP party on the Kurdish society. 
Later the Erdogan government accepted to meet with DTP deputies and dialogue with 
regard to end conflict accelerated. On the other hand, as on Figure 4.10 shows there 
was expectation of the trust of government on the PKK. This trust emerged not because 
of the attitude and behavior of the PKK, but from the hope that the Erdogan 
government had. The Erdogan government was hopeful to end the Kurdish conflict 
through democratic reforms. This hope triggered the Erdogan government to insist on 
its initiatives regardless of any positive reaction from the PKK. This atmosphere of the 
hope for ending the conflict based on democratic initiatives was demolished with the 
Habur incident which caused trauma on the Turks. Erdogan decided to “pause Kurdish 
initiative” after that incident. After that incident there was closure of the DTP by 
Constitutional Court with the claim of its links with the PKK (Hurriyet Daily News, 
Turkey's Kurdish deputies to join BDP in Parliament, 2009). The attitude of the 
Erdogan government with regard to support them to stay on Parliament shows that, 
there was still willingness of the government to use political institutions to end the 
Kurdish conflict (Ibid.).  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Aceh conflict during the president elections campaign became an important 
instrument for candidates to influence electorates. Since people wanted this problem 
solved, it became powerful instrument for leaders to be elected and/or to get support 
of the society for their policies.  
 
In 1999, GAM did not trust the GoI (Government of Indonesia) and GAM members 
insisted on referendum for independence (Kearney, Autonomy not enough for Aceh?, 
1999a). Also in 1999 GAM decided to boycott the elections since it claimed they are 
independent state and Indonesia was labelled as “colonizer state” (Ibid.).  We can see 
similar attitudes from the Kurdish case too. In Kurdish case, the PKK labelled Turkish 
security forces as in Kurdish region as an “imperialist state” (Hurriyet Daily News, 
Erdogan: There is no such thing as the "Kurdish minority", 2005c). What caused the 
prolongation of the Aceh conflict was the insistence of GAM on its bid for 
independence. Unlikely, the PKK and Pro-Kurdish deputies generally demanded 
autonomy for Kurdish region, but they sometimes threatened Turkish state with 
“separation from Turkish state” if military operations continues and the Kurdish 
initiative fails (AFP, Military: Three Kurdish terrorists killed in Turkey, 2009). Both 
in the Aceh and Kurdish cases because of the continued military operations against 
GAM members and PKK members there was mistrust against positive statements of 
state leaders and conciliatory gestures on the resolution of the conflict. For example, 
in the Aceh conflict there were visits of the leaders to show the Acehnese people they 
are willing to solve the Aceh conflict but especially from GAM leadership cadre there 
was no any positive reply to these gestures from the state. In the Kurdish case since 
the Erdogan government did not accept the PKK as a representative of the Kurdish 
society, military operations continued against the PKK and in return the PKK 
continued its attacks within Turkey. Until 2009 Erdogan rejected to meet Pro-Kurdish 
DTP deputies with regard to the Kurdish problem (Hurriyet Daily News, Turkish gov't 
pledges more democracy to resolve Kurdish problem, 2009). In 1999 after Suharto 
regime, President Habibie apologized for mistakes in the past and similar statements 
continued by successor presidents as well (McDonald, 1999; AFP, Indonesian 
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president arrives for first visit to troubled Aceh, 2000c). In the Kurdish case Erdogan’s 
Diyarbakir trip was a turning point for the Kurdish conflict (Hurriyet Daily News, 
Erdogan claims responsibility for Kurdish conflict, 2005n). In the Diyarbakir trip for 
the first time in Turkish history at the government level the Kurdish problem was 
officially accepted. Erdogan accepted, “mistakes in the past have done” and said, 
“Kurdish problem is our problem” (Hurriyet Daily News, Erdogan: Kurdish Problem 
different from PKK terrorism, 2005w). These statements created hope among the 
Kurdish society and accordingly between 20 August 2005 and October 2005 the PKK 
unilaterally declared ceasefire (Stratejik Araştırmalar Enstitüsü, 2010). But since there 
was continued military operations and strong stance of the military against the Erdogan 
government’s “white page” for the Kurdish problem caused failure of the initiatives 
on its resolution. At that time Turkish Land Forces Commander Yaşar Büyükanıt on 
30 August 2005 said that Turkey becomes like Palestine (Stratejik Araştırmalar 
Enstitüsü, 2010).  Since there was strong criticism from military and opposition parties 
Erdogan abstained take important step with regard to the Kurdish problem. Also the 
Şemdinli incident on October 9, 2005 caused violence in cities of southeastern of the 
Turkey since the provocateurs were military officials (Sabah, 2005). After this incident 
mistrust among Kurdish citizens against the Turkish state re-emerged again but the 
Erdogan government insisted on its willingness to solve the Kurdish problem. 
Although there were not important steps in later years until 2009, there were still some 
reforms that decreased impact of the Kurdish problem on society. In 2006 RTÜK lifted 
sanctions on Kurdish language movies and music on broadcasting (Hurriyet Daily 
News, Limits o Kurdish movies and music lifted, 2006). In 2007 since there was debate 
over president election and during president election debate in 2007 e-memorandum 
of the Turkish army prevented Erdogan’s government to continue its reforms on the 
Kurdish problem (Stratejik Araştırmalar Enstitüsü, 2010). Apart from that the PKK 
continued its attacks on security forces in 2006 and 2007. Actions of the PKK also 
caused Turks criticism on the Kurdish initiative of the Erdogan government. Until 
2009, Erdogan government’s politics with regard to the Kurdish problem was frozen.  
On the other hand, Aceh dialogue was started with Habibie’s presidency and 
government’s offer for dialogue with GAM was rejected by Hasan di Tiro since 
“[they] are independent” (The Irish Times, 1999). In Indonesia the GoI tried to start 
a dialogue with GAM and the successor of Habibie, president Wahid, accepted 
referendum in Aceh but he faced oppression of the Indonesian military so he later 
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abstained to implement referendum in the region (Ibid.). As we can see in both the 
Aceh and Kurdish cases, there was military stood against initiating dialogue with the 
adversary group leaders and implementation of the reforms for resolution of the 
conflict (The Irish Times, 1999; Hurriyet Daily News, Kurdish politicians criticize 
operation, 2008). In the Aceh case because of the promise of the referendum was not 
kept GAM leadership cadre did not trust other initiatives of President Wahid and 
during his visit to the Aceh province GAM insisted for independence but it was 
rejected again (Moulson, 2000). Different from the Kurdish case, in the Aceh conflict 
the GoI started talks with GAM members and through these talks GAM accepted 
ceasefire in 2000s. Since state accepted to meet with GAM members the opportunity 
for both side to communicate with each other and unveil their demands from each other 
became easier. Different, in the Kurdish conflict it was not the case. Erdogan’s meeting 
with DTP leader Ahmet Turk happened on August 2009 after his first statements about 
the Kurdish problem in 2005. In Kurdish conflict whom to take authorized counter 
party was the problem in Kurdish conflict (CNN Türk, Başlangıçtan bugüne gün gün 
çözüm süreci, 2014).  
 
In 2001 we see that with the Megawati presidency, the GoI increased its efforts to end 
the Aceh conflict in the region. Like her predecessors Megawati also visited Aceh and 
called for dialogue and during she accepted government’s had been done mistakes in 
the past (Harisumarto, Indonesia's Megawati visits Aceh, 2001; Suwastoyo, 2001). 
Moreover, different from her predecessors Megawati released the student leader from 
Aceh and this symbolic gesture contributed relations between GAM and the 
Indonesian state (Tjandraningsih, Aceh independence activist released from prison, 
2001). During Megawati’s presidency 2002 was peak year for peace talks and 
meetings between GAM and the GoI.  As in the Kurdish case in 2005, at first months 
of the 2002 Indonesian Army Chief of Staff General Ryamizard Ryacudu showed his 
opposition towards government’s talks with GAM members and said there was “no 
longer need to engage in talks with GAM” (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Military chief 
warns state of emergency is imminent in Aceh, 2002b). Although there was opposition 
from military and opposition parties on Aceh peace talks, Megawati resumed talks 
with GAM and these talks contributed to GAM’s acceptance of a special autonomy 
offer (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Government, Aceh rebels to resume peace talks in 
Geneva, 2002e). Also with resumed agreements in 2002 trust between adversary 
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groups increased and important decisions were taken (Ibid.). But since Megawati was 
not strong enough to resist oppression of the military, peace process in 2002 failed and 
it resulted in increased military operation in 2003 and implementation of martial law 
to Aceh province (Aspinall & Crouch, 2003). In 2003 like in the Kurdish case, 
President Megawati differentiated problem in Aceh with GAM and because of 
changing discourse military operations in the region increased vehemently while on 
the other hand important projects started in Aceh by the GoI (Deutsche Presse-
Agentur, Megawati expects to end Aceh conflict as sson as possible, 2003n). Because 
of the changing discourse of the state towards GAM and increased military operation 
in 2003 we witnessed increased GAM attacks too. (Aspinall & Crouch, 2003). From 
2003 until the tsunami disaster at the end of 2004 conflict escalator moves became 
more common between adversary parties Figure 5.1). There were arrest of GAM 
negotiators, prevention of journalists and peace monitors to enter the Aceh region 
(AFP, Philippines still hopeful of peaceful solution to Aceh crisis, 2003f).  
 
 
Figure 5.1. Aceh Conflict in Years 
 
As we can see from the Figure 5.1 conflict escalator moves in 1999 (49%), 2002 
(27%), 2003 (44%), and 2004 (79%) are higher than conciliatory gestures. Moreover, 
in those years except 2002, independence-autonomy debate affected peace talks in 
negative ways since GAM insisted on an independence demand. In 2002 dialogue and 
peace process was also common in that year, but as mentioned before because of critic 
of Indonesian military positive developments in 2002 resulted in military operations 
and martial law. As we can see that, although there was also occurrence of conciliatory 
gestures in 1999, 2002, 2003, and 2004; but because of conflict escalator moves their 
effects on relations between GAM and the GoI were few. In 2000 and 2001 although 
conciliatory gestures were more frequent than conflict escalator moves, strong conflict 
escalator moves such as military operation, GAM attacks and GAM’s bid for 
independence prevented success of peace talk to end the Aceh conflict. In 2005, 
107 
 
conciliatory gestures gained momentum after the 2004 tsunami disaster and peace 
process talks and dialogue between adversary parties instead of negatively effecting 
peace process contributed relations between parties and increased trust between them. 
In 2004 the change in the structure of the Indonesian assembly also affected the 
approach of the GoI (Government of Indonesia) to the Aceh conflict (AFP, Indonesia 
steps up security as Megawati prepares for Aceh, 2004j). In the 1999 election, there 
were party leaders who had the mind of the New Order of the former Suharto regime 
(Meitzner, 2006). But with legislative election on 5 April 2004, the leading party was 
changed and the change of the leadership of the leading party in the assembly who was 
pro-dialogue contributed development for the resolution of the Aceh conflict (Ibid.). 
Jusuf Kallag became leader of the Golkar party, leading party in the Indonesian 
assembly (Meitzner, 2006). He was willing to solve the Aceh conflict through 
mediation and dialogue and also during his vice-presidency of the SBY (Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono) presidency, with SBY he got opportunity to continue his 
assertive peace process. But since there was not strong leadership in the Presidency, 
change of leadership at leading party did few effect on transformation of the Aceh 
conflict. SBY became president of the Indonesia and Jusuf Kallag became his Vice 
President at office (AFP, Indonesian front-runner promises "safer, more prosperous" 
condtion in war-torn Aceh province, 2004f). When SBY became president he removed 
Indonesian Army Chief of Staff General Ryamizard Ryacudu, die-hard critic of peace 
talk with GAM, one year before his retirement, which was unusual move in Indonesian 
circle (Meitzner, 2006). This change of leader of Indonesian army by SBY contributed 
to gain support of the military on peace talks with GAM. Also after the tsunami disaster 
the power of GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) and the Indonesian military was 
diminished and Aceh province was totally devastated as a result of the tsunami 
(Klimesova, 2016). SBY used the structure of post-tsunami Aceh as an advantage and 
resumed talks with GAM. In 2005, GAM and the GoI resumed talks and with the 
facilitation of the CMI (Crisis Management Initiative), five rounds of talks took place 
in Helsinki (Klimesova, 2016). During peace talks GAM renounced their 
independence bid, the GoI released arrested GAM members who did not use weapons, 
and special autonomy was given to Aceh province.  
 
For the Kurdish case, 2009 was important year for the Kurdish initiative. In 2009, the 
Erdogan government agreed to meet with the Kurdish DTP leader. On March 2009, 
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before his departure to Baghdad, President Abdullah Gul used “Kurdistan” when he 
talked about Northern Iraq (CNN Türk, Başlangıçtan bugüne gün gün çözüm süreci, 
2014). Later on May 2009 Gul said, “Kurdish problem is our main problem and it 
must be solved” (Hurriyet Daily News, ProKurdish party expects Gul to give 
appointment, 2009; CNN Türk, Başlangıçtan bugüne gün gün çözüm süreci, 2014). At 
this positive atmosphere in 2009, the PKK declared it prolonged its unilateral ceasefire 
on May 2009 (CNN Türk, Başlangıçtan bugüne gün gün çözüm süreci, 2014). After 
that thanks to continued meetings with intellectuals and with Kurdish deputies, 34 
PKK members were allowed to enter Turkey through passing from the Habur border 
gate (Hurriyet Daily News, The final turn in government's Kurdsih opening, 2009). 
But in the Habur border gate, celebrative welcome of PKK members caused anger 
among Turkish citizens and also the Turkish government did not welcome images from 
that day. After that incident Erdogan decided to “take a break” for the Kurdish 
initiative (Hurriyet Daily News, Turkey pauses Kurdish move, delays PKK returns, 
2009). Also at the end of the 2009 the pro-Kurdish DTP was closed by the 
Constitutional Court which the case was opened in 2007 with the claim of DTP’s link 
with the PKK (Hurriyet Daily News, Turkey's Kurdish deputies to join BDP in 
Parliament, 2009).  
 
 
Figure 5.2. Kurdish Conflict in Years 
 
As we can see from Figure 5.2, conflict escalator moves were higher than conciliatory 
gestures in 2007. As aforementioned in 2007 there was crisis of the Presidential 
election and e-memorandum by TSK (Turkish Armed Forces) that caused government 
to focus on domestic political problems. Although in 2005 and 2006 conciliatory 
gestures by the state were higher than conflict escalator moves, because of strong 
critics in the TSK against Erdogan’s Kurdish initiative there were not peace talks 
directly with PKK members and Kurdish members of parliament (Hurriyet Daily 
News, Overwhelming reaction to Erdogan's reference to "Kurdsih Problem", 2005s). 
2005 was the first time use of the “Kurdish problem” at official level and in 2005 great 
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hope emerged with Erdogan’s willing to end the Kurdish conflict (Hurriyet Daily 
News, Military,government meet to assess terror, and "Kurdish problem", 2005y). 
Thirty times of mentioned conciliatory gestures, which occupied 60 per cent of all 
codes, created hope among the Kurds and the Turks in Turkey. But since there was 
still a powerful army at that time, the Kurdish initiative in 2005 failed, especially after 
the Şemdinli incident (Hurriyet Daily News, Erdogan: Kurdish Problem different from 
PKK terrorism, 2005w). Also according to Mitchell for success of conciliatory 
gestures to end conflict, there should less conflict escalator moves, which cause 
mistrust between adversary parties (Mitchell, Gestures of Conciliaton: Factors 
Contributing to Successful Olive Branches, 2000). Accordingly, in 2009 there was 
declaration of the Kurdish Initiative/Opening by the government and there were some 
meetings held with intellectuals and NGOs with regard to the Kurdish problem. In 
2009 concrete steps were taken on the Kurdish conflict such as TRT 6 started 
broadcasting in Kurmanji, Sorani, and Zazaki dialects of Kurdish, Kurdish inmates 
allowed to converse with their relatives in language other than Turkish (Hurriyet Daily 
News, RTÜK approves Kurdsih broadcasts, 2006; The final turn in government's 
Kurdsih opening, 2009).  Although conciliatory gestures in 2009 reached its peak, 
Erdogan’s Kurdish initiative was failed since government did not welcomed images in 
the Habur incident on October 19, 2009 (CNN Türk, Başlangıçtan bugüne gün gün 
çözüm süreci, 2014).  
 
As a result, both the Kurdish and the Aceh cases were generally affected from critical 
stances of military forces in both Indonesia and Turkey. In Indonesia SBY removed 
the Army Chief of Staff General Ryamizard Ryacudu so that by this move he 
guaranteed to decrease opposition of the TNI (Indonesian National Armed Forces). 
Also the tsunami disaster created opportunity for SBY to resume peace talks since the 
tsunami disaster decreased military capability of GAM and the TNI (Klimesova, 
2016). It is important to mention that since GAM was weakened as a result of the 
tsunami, SBY instead of attacking GAM to finish them, preferred to use dialogue to 
end conflict in peaceful way. In the Kurdish case Erdogan was against to meet with 
Kurdish Member of Parliament until 2009 and with PKK members. It was because 
Turkish society was not ready for this new approach to the Kurdish conflict. At first 
level Erdogan first used the “Kurdish problem” at top level, in later years he met with 
DTP leader Ahmet Turk. As Yalçın Akdoğan said that they needed time to make 
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Turkish society to be accustomed to Kurdish initiative started by Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan (Çakir, 2011a). To sum up, strong leadership is a determinant factor in the 
peace talks and a strong leader who willing to end conflict with their attitude and 
behaviors could construct a culture of peace in their society. 
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